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ABSTRACT 
My dissertation tries to solve two puzzling questions in China’s economic miracle: why 
some private firms enjoy better property rights protection than others under similar 
political and economic institutional conditions. Secondly, under the incentive structure 
designed by the central government, why some local officials in some localities actively 
protected private property rights than others hence foster local economic development. 
Existing literature either emphasizes social networks or focuses on fiscal decentralization 
and personnel control system. But neither these accounts is able to systematically explain 
the considerable variation of private property rights protection across regions and over 
time. 
I develop a game-theoretical model to study the political economy of property rights 
in China, that is, a bargaining game between a firm and a local political official to explain 
these empirical puzzles. Under the current institutional arrangements, resources and 
constraints created by the incentive structure of the Cadre Evaluation System (CES) 
affect goals and strategies of both local political officials and private investors in that 
bargaining relationship. A firm with a high level of Firm Specific Assets (FSAs) may 
possess strong post-entry bargaining power, and thus enjoy better protection of the local 
official, but a weak firm is vulnerable to the local officials’ predatory activities, and
vii 
therefore needs to rely on other mechanisms, such as their social networks or bribery, to 
overcome the commitment problem. In particular, all else being equal, the availability of 
an exit option greatly enhances the private firms’ post-entry bargaining power vis-à-vis 
local political actors.  
In addition, the degree of symbiotic relationship between the local officials and 
indigenous private entrepreneurs determines the level of private property protection. 
Compared to rotated officials, native local officials have fewer political connections with 
higher-level officials and therefore have less chance to be promoted in the power 
hierarchy. This condition makes them seek the support of local economic actors for their 
political survival. Moreover, native local political leaders who were born in their 
jurisdiction have lower transaction costs, and therefore a symbiotic relationship between 
native local officials and local private entrepreneurs is feasible. The chances were high 
that the native leaders would have close ties to local economic actors and face more strict 
social constraints; therefore, they were more likely to protect local property rights. 
I statistically test the effects of firms’ characteristics on the security of property 
rights using different types of evidence including a nationwide survey data in 2012 and 
media reports on government-related property rights expropriation cases. With the proxy 
of property rights protection, I also provide systematic empirical evidence from 
Guangdong province both cross-sectionally and over time to test the effects of different 
types of local political leaders by investigating the characteristics of 203 prefecture-level 
political leaders between 1992 and 2008. A detailed case study of local B&B industry 
viii 
policymaking in Xiamen, Fujian province, utilizing government reports, news reports, as 
well as interview notes of fieldwork, further supports the model.
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The Puzzle of Property Rights Protection in China 
Property rights are believed to be a critical factor fostering economic growth (North 
1990). And yet, authoritarian governments often have difficulty in making credible 
commitments to protect property rights, thus negatively affecting economic development 
(Acemoglu et al. 2001; Weingast 1995). Nonetheless, and contrary to conventional 
wisdom, China has been able to achieve an economic miracle despite the absence of 
credible institutions to protect property rights. The case of China poses an intellectual 
puzzle. Private ownership has been increasing dramatically without the rule of law to 
overcome the commitment problem. China enacted its first law to explicitly protect 
private property in 2007, but the law does not provide enough details or effective 
enforcement mechanisms. With one-party communist rule and no independent judicial 
system to protect property rights, private investors, especially those indigenous private 
entrepreneurs, may appear to be taking a big risk.  
To solve the puzzle, several explanations have been offered to account for how 
China has been able to overcome its institutional deficiencies and make credible 
commitments to investors. Research on property rights in China often resorts to social 
networks (Nee and Opper 2012; Wang 2013; Tsai 2002; Wang 2002; Wank 1999), fiscal 
federalism (Oi 1999; Qian and Weingast 1997; Weingast 1995), or the personnel control 
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system (Li and Zhou 2005). Despite all the efforts, we have little knowledge about why 
some private firms enjoy better property rights protection than others under similar 
political and economic institutional conditions. Under the incentive structure designed by 
the central government, why did some local officials in some localities actively protect 
private property rights more than their counterparts hence fostering economic 
development?  
Instead of looking for reasons of economic growth or China’s economic miracle, 
which has been studied extensively by existing literature, this research is interested in the 
solutions to overcome the commitment problem in China. I provide a political-economic 
explanation that shows some solutions may result from strategic interactions among 
political and economic actors at the local level rather than solely as a result of a 
commitment device from above. Studying these questions with focus on local institutions 
is not to suggest that the central government has lost its imperative grips over economic 
matter. Rather, this research is to specify the mechanisms that have fostered the de facto 
property rights under political institutions designed by the central government. Local 
agents have reached a relatively stable equilibrium under certain conditions and with 
various resources.  
1.1 Local Officials and Variations in Property Rights Protection 
The development of the private sector in China has gone through an uneven path of 
institutional and structural changes. From the perspective of local economic actors, 
market-oriented policy and 2007 law of property rights are clear signals regarding the 
central authority’s commitment for the development of private economy. But with 
occasional “left” and “right” ideological swing and no independent judicial system, the 
3 
 
government could not make that commitment credible in terms of property rights 
protection. 
China’s policy was favorable toward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) not only 
because China needs capital, technology, and access to the global market but also 
because China wants to show its commitment to be open to the outside world. In this 
way, China’s policy toward FDI as a self-enforcing mechanism addresses the 
commitment problem.  
Less favorable than foreign investors, however, domestic private entrepreneurs have 
been facing a more difficult situation in which the commitment problem is the major one. 
As with most of China’s economic reforms, policies governing the private sector have 
evolved in an experimental, incremental, and sometimes contradictory manner. As a 
result, private entrepreneurs can only rely on themselves in protecting their property 
rights. 
Although there are similar formal institutional arrangements at subnational levels in 
China, each locality still enjoys a certain degree of autonomy. Generally, operations of 
private firms are embedded in complex local institutions and social networks that affect 
the day-to-day interactions between local political actors and private firms. While the 
central government has demonstrated their commitment to a market economy and thus 
reduced the political risks faced by private firms, local governments often emerge as a 
major source of uncertainty for the firms. Moreover, because of the “local autonomy” 
nature of the personnel control system and the moral hazard problem inherent in a 
principal-agent relationship between different levels of government, whether local 
governments play “grabbing hands,” “helping hands,” or “steady hands” really depends 
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on the individual local officials. Without an effective institutional mechanism to tie local 
political actors’ hands, private investors would face a significant risk because once their 
investments are in place, their bargaining power diminishes, local governments may not 
stick to their promises, and local political leaders with their great deal of discretionary 
power may pursue their own political and economic goals vis-à-vis the private firms. 
1.2 The Theoretical Framework: A Bargaining Game 
This research starts from the point that most Chinese local political actors are 
supervisors of the governments (both central and local) and simultaneously principal of 
their immediate subordinates at lower levels. The most powerful incentive that drives 
these local agents is their concern to get more power through promotion in the multi-
layered power hierarchy. The “competition for promotion” literature assumes that the 
primary goal of local political leaders is to be promoted to a higher rank (Li and Zhou 
2005). I relax this assumption by including economic interests. The local official is thus 
assumed to be an expected utility-maximizer. His/her goals include not only promotion 
(career concerns) but also monetary interests. Local political actors’ economic interests 
are achieved through the pursuit of political power due to the unique career pattern in 
China. Chapter 2 will show three distinct features of the career patterns of political actors 
within the Chinese power hierarchy: 1) almost permanent tenure as long as secured in an 
office; 2) almost no job options outside the political career once you are in; 3) age limits 
for mandatory retirement (Li and Zhou 2005).   
As Chapter 2 details, the Cadre Evaluation System (CES) is widely believed to be 
an incentive structure designed by the central government to help control local officials in 
the administrative hierarchy.  It can be used to discipline local party and government 
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leaders and increase their compliance with the policies made by higher-level 
governments (O’Brien and Li 1999; Whiting 2001; 2004; Edin 2003; Tsui and Wang 
2004; Heimer 2006; Minzner 2009). The CES powerfully shaped the behavior of Chinese 
local officials by linking both monetary interests and promotion incentives to their 
performance on the tasks listed in the system. 
Scholars identify four important factors that determine the prospect of further 
promotion of local officials: 1) job performance within the jurisdiction; 2) education; 3) 
age; 4) personal ties with one’s superior in charge of promotion. For some scholars, the 
first one is one of the most important factors (Li & Zhou 2005), while others argue the 
last one (Zhong 2003). One thing worth noting is that local officials will be rewarded 
according to how well they meet the standard but rarely be punished (demoted) if they 
don’t.1 
For building up an effective control and incentive mechanism, term limits and 
rotation system were introduced that intends to solve the problem of asymmetric 
information, shirking, and monitoring. Both term limits and the cadre rotation system are 
expected to serve the purpose of aligning divergent preferences and reducing asymmetric 
information.  More specifically, the rotation system is expected to prevent tie-cultivation 
in the hierarchical power structure and local protectionism (Chen and Zhao 1996; 
Blanchard and Shleifer 2001; Zhong 2003).  
In discussing the role of local political officials on economic growth, the existing 
literature often confuses the goals of local political leaders and that of local government. I 
detach political actors from government because the goals of government are not always 
                                                          
1 This is due to the first distinct feature of the career pattern in China administrative hierarchy. 
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identical with those of political actors and hence I reconsider the role of local political 
leaders on economic development in general and property rights protection in particular. 
There are three players in the local economy, Government (G) is the principal, the 
local political official serves (S) as the supervisor and the Private entrepreneur (P) is the 
agent. In the context of China, I identify political actors as local political leaders, 
economic actors as indigenous private entrepreneurs, and government includes central 
and local.  
I make an extremely simple assumption that the goal of government and political 
actors may not be the same. Government (G), both central and local, cares about tax 
revenue and the primary and foremost concern of local political leaders (S) is to stay in 
office and be promoted to a higher rank. The ultimate goal of local officials, however, is 
to acquire more wealth and secure their possessions. In other words, the pursuit of 
political power is the means to achieve the end (wealth acquisition). The old saying 
“shengguan facai” (more power more money)2 demonstrates the logic of career concerns 
with Chinese characteristics. For the indigenous private entrepreneur (P), what he/she 
wants is not only to maximize profit but also to secure property rights. 
The theoretical literature indicates that the solution to the commitment problem may 
result from strategic interactions among political and economic actors rather than solely 
as a result of a commitment device (Weimer 2001). Chapter 2 presents a simple 
bargaining game between a private firm and a local official following the literature of the 
Obsolescing Bargain Model (OBM) and the Political Bargaining Model (PBM), which 
explain bargaining relations between a FDI firm and a host country (Vernon 1971; Eden 
et al. 2005). Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 discuss in detail the resources and constraints of 
                                                          
2 The old saying Shengguan Facai implies that if the power not for money, why power? 
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local political officials under the current personnel control system and private sector 
investors, and show how these conditions and constraints determine their bargaining 
power in the bargaining process. 
I model the relationship as a bargaining game with conflicting goals, and hypothesize 
that a firm has strong bargaining power at the time of entry when the local official, under 
the pressure of the performance–based evaluation by his or her immediate superiors, 
understands that the firm has other options. However, once the firm has made sector-
specific investment, its capability to resist the official’s predatory actions relies upon its 
firm-specific characteristics. Chapter 3 identifies the mechanisms that may resolve the 
credible commitment problem and shows how the incentive structure designed by the 
central government constrains the predatory activities of the local officials in dealing with 
private firms with a high level of Firm Specific Assets (FSAs). In this way, the incentive 
structure provided by the CES, worked together with the firm-specific characteristics, 
results in a stable condition for the protection of property rights. While a firm with a high 
level of FSAs may possess strong post-entry bargaining power, and thus enjoy the 
protection of the local official, a weak firm has to rely on other mechanisms, such as its 
social networks, to overcome the hurdle. 
Another equilibrium that emerges from the symbiotic relationship between local 
political officials and economic agents, which creates conditions similar to secure 
property rights at the local level. The degree of symbiotic relationship between the local 
officials and indigenous private entrepreneurs determines the level of private property 
protection. Compared to transferred officials, native local officials have fewer political 
connections with higher level officials and therefore have less chance to be promoted in 
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the power hierarchy. This condition makes them seek the support of local economic 
actors for their political survival. Moreover, native local political leaders who were born 
in their jurisdiction have lower transaction costs, and therefore a symbiotic relationship 
between native local officials and local private entrepreneurs is feasible and easier. The 
chances were high that the native leaders would have close ties to local economic actors 
and face more strict social constraints; therefore, they were more likely to protect 
property rights.  
1.3 What Is Property Rights? An Operational Definition 
The term “property rights” has two traditions in the economic literature. One is 
defined as the ability to enjoy a piece of property (Alchian 1965, 1987; Cheung 1969). 
The other older definition stresses that “what the state assigns to a person” or the 
enforcement of rights (Ellickson 1991; Barzel 1997). Barzel calls the first “economic 
property rights” and the second “legal property rights.” He argues that “economic rights 
are the end (that is, what people ultimately seek), whereas legal rights are the means to 
achieve the end” (Barzel 1997: 3).  
I use the definition that includes both economic rights and legal rights with focus on 
legal rights and the enforcement of rights. This is especially relevant as China is still a 
socialist state despite decades of economic reform. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
tried very hard to eliminate private property rights since it seized power in 1949. Before 
the Reform era starting in 1978, private property was strictly forbidden. Anyone who ran 
a private business would be severely punished, including being arrested and persecuted. 
Only in 2007, China enacted its first law to explicitly protect private property rights, but 
it still does not provide enough details for the enforcement of the law. 
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There are two theoretical traditions that identify the threat to private property rights. 
In the view of Hobbes, the main threat to property rights is from private actors, and 
therefore requires strong state institutions as a remedy. Another line of argument lies in 
the tradition of Locke, which sees the threat to private property rights within the state 
itself, and therefore implies limiting state power to reduce arbitrary behavior in private 
property rights. At any rate, preventing the threats from both private actors and the state 
requires the rule of law. 
In addition, the theoretical literature on the interaction of political and economic 
institutions shows that there is an inherent paradox on the interaction between the strong 
state and economic development. The problem is that any government strong enough to 
specify and protect property rights is also strong enough to seize them for its own benefit 
(North and Weingast 1989). How government can provide a credible commitment to its 
people is crucial for economic growth to occur in an authoritarian regime. The logic is 
that unless the government can provide a credible commitment to the population that it 
will not act in its own short-term interests by seizing property, the population will not 
invest. If there is no investment, there will be little economic activity, hence no growth.3 
In order to generate economic growth, the government must not only establish the set of 
rights but also must make a credible commitment to the population.4  
The core interest of this research is to identify the mechanisms to overcome the 
commitment problem in China. For this purpose, it will focus on the threats from the state 
to private property rights. Basically, there are two types of predatory actions that may be 
                                                          
3 Stephen Haber, Razo Armando and Maurer Noel. The Politics of Property Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), p. 2 
4 Douglass North and Barry Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitment: the Evolution of Institutions Governing Public 
Choice in Seventeenth-Century England”, The Journal of Economic History, Vol XLIX, Number 4, December 1989.  
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taken by the state: direct and indirect taking of property. Direct taking of property can 
take various forms, ranging from outright nationalization on a sectoral basis to the seizure 
of a firm by the government to outright confiscation of the property (Zheng 2007).5 In the 
case of China, indirect expropriations are a common practice manipulated by local 
officials, which may involve arbitrary fees and fines collected by local governments, or 
even “charitable contributions” to government-sponsored projects (Nee and Opper 2013). 
1.4 Research Contributions 
It is often argued that countries without the rule of law can rely only on other 
mechanisms to overcome the commitment problem. The current literature identifies 
several solutions to the credible commitment problem. While the authoritarian system is a 
big problem for potential investors who are concerned about political risk, dictators with 
a long time-horizon have encompassing interests and therefore may undertake proactive 
actions to improve economic institutions in order to raise sustainable tax revenues (Olson 
1993; 2000; McGuire and Olson 1996). My study contributes to the literature on how 
authoritarian governments may be engaged in institution-building to encourage 
investment and hence to promote economic growth (Olson 1993, 2000). In particular, this 
research shows how the incentive structure set up by the central government in China 
constrains the local officials’ predatory activities in dealing with private firms with an 
exit option.  
Second, my work is also related to the studies on selective protection of property 
rights. Both Greif and Haber et al. show how autocratic rulers enforce property rights 
selectively as a private good (Greif 2006; Haber et al. 2003). These rulers used different 
                                                          




strategies, trading the property rights protection of private owners for political support. 
Similarly, Robinson (2003) and Treisman (2003) demonstrate how the reformers of 
modern Russia, Argentina, and Brazil made similar deals with special interest groups to 
promote their reform agendas. Greif (2006) shows how the commitment problem can be 
solved through reputation or collective reputation, while Haber et al. (2003) focus on the 
third-party enforcement. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) provide other examples and 
build a theory of a non-democratic government that is accountable to a selectorate, a 
group that has the power to determine the fate of the incumbent. Still other scholars 
suggest that political institutions like legislatures, parties, and even elections could work 
in a way to “credibly tie the dictator’s hands” against predatory actions, at least against a 
small group of elite (Gandhi 2008a; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007).  
In this research, I provide evidence for the selective protection of property rights in 
another authoritarian regime, China, where the incentive structure designed by the central 
government creates conditions for secure property rights. My study reveals that, though 
facing the same institutional constraints of the CES, different types of local officials may 
act differently in dealing with private investment with dissimilar firm specific 
characteristics. Firms with high FSAs may possess strong post-entry bargaining power 
over local officials, and thus enjoy better protection of the local officials. Those native 
local officials who have less chance to be promoted are more likely in protecting private 
property rights, trading the property rights protection for their political survival. 
Third, there is heated debate on whether behaviors of Chinese local states are 
developmental, corporatists, entrepreneurial, and predatory in terms of economic 
development, or whether economic performance results from inter-jurisdictional 
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competition or factional politics at the center (Li and Zhou 2005; Cai and Traisman 2006; 
Shih 2004; Shih et al. 2012). This study contributes to the debate by specifying the 
conditions under which local officials may play “grabbing hands” (predatory activities), 
“helping hands” (developmental orientation) (Shleifer and Vishny 1998), or “steady 
hands” (stable and credible protection of property rights). In particular, this research 
specifies conditions under which private property rights may be protected in an 
authoritarian regime. The study proposes a political-economic explanation of secure 
property rights, where the local political leaders protect private rights when symbiosis 
between local officials and private entrepreneurs is feasible.  
Fourth, in the study of China’s economic development, scholars emphasize China’s 
political centralization in reducing risks of local protectionsm and competition for rents 
(Blanchard and Shleifer 2000), and central coordination and enforcement capability in 
excersing macro-economic control over excessive and destructive local autonomy 
(Huang 1996; Li and Lian 1999). My work shows how the discretionary power resulted 
by the “local autonomy” feature of the CES led to the positive effects of local 
protectionism. Native political leaders tend to protect private property rights because they 
have less chances to be promoted in the power hierarchy and need the support from local 
economic actors for their political survival.  
The study is also related to the literature of evaluating political connections in which 
the benefits are captured by economic actors with strong connections with political 
leaders (Fisman 2001; Faccio 2006). But this study also stresses the interdependent 
relationships between political and economic actors.  
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Finally, this research touches on the issue of corruption. Most studies suggest that the 
existing corruption levels are detrimental to development (Shleifer and Vishny 1993); 
yet, some argue for efficiency-enhancing corruption, the effects of which may be positive 
(Leff 1964; Huntington 1968; Li and Wu 2010). Hopefully, this paper will shed some 
new light on the coexistence of rapid growth and rising corruption in China (Li and Wu 
2010; Wademan 2012). Some studies further distinguish among different types of 
corruption (Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Sun 2004; Wedeman 1997; Manion 2014).  This 
study will emphasize the mutually beneficial exchange nature of corruption. 
1.5 Research Design 
This research mainly uses sub-provincial level comparisons combining both 
qualitative and quantitative approaches. Sub-provincial comparisons can put macro 
institutional factors under control. Most studies on the role of local officials focus on 
provincial level officials. However, in countries like China there exists vast regional 
variation in fiscal arrangement, legal environment, and political and economic conditions. 
Therefore, it is not an appropriate context to study the empirical puzzling questions in 
this research. Sub-provincial studies in this research can put the institutional 
arrangements factor under control. 
Sub-provincial level studies will also enable us to see processes such as economic 
reform or the cadre evaluation system as shown in this research, often have varied effects 
across the territorially-defined subunits of a political system. Studies on China’s 
economic development often focus on the variation in economic performance between 
provinces, which does not explain the vast intra-provincial variation.  
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As for empirical studies, one of the biggest challenges of this research is to gauge 
variation in property rights protection in China, as there is not much research available to 
refer to and no indicators ready to use. I use arbitrary fees and fines paid by private firms 
and collected by the local government as an indicator to measure the degree of property 
rights expropriation. Chapter 3 provides discussion to justify the measurement. 
I also use private investment in fixed assets as an indicator to measure the security of 
property rights. This is a good proxy for the security of property rights because this kind 
of investment requires significant immediate costs with only promise of future revenue. 
Chapter 4 details the justification of the identification as compared to the common use of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate or GDP per capita measurement in the study 
of economic development. 
The detailed case study provides additional evidence to support my theory. The 
materials of case study are collected from my fieldwork in Xiamen, China from 2014 to 
2015. For the basic facts of policymaking case, I use government reports, news reports, as 
well as interviews. It is noteworthy that interviews only serve as supplementary sources 
of information. The validity and reliability of constructed interviews may be questionable 
with its intervening nature, particular when informants consciously and unconsciously 
make sense of their research. The examination of media reports and government reports 
will help to restore an original context that seeks to make concrete reasons state agents 
give for their actions. My interviewees included officials, B&B business owners, 
chairmen of B&B associations, journalists, and scholars in Xiamen. To the purpose of 
methodological reliability in the interviews, I tried to ask the same questions of different 
people to find common answers. 
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For the unit of analysis, all the administrators between the central government and 
the village level are middle level supervisors, and should be included in the pool of 
observations. But for theory building and empirical studies, I locate the research at the 
prefecture municipality level. The municipal cities are the third level of China’s political 
hierarchy. The top leaders at the municipal city level are the city Party secretary and the 
city mayors. This reflects the dual presence of communists Party and government organs 
at each level of China’s political hierarchy. 
Moreover, officials at various levels of government may behave differently in 
accordance with the resources they have in the face of the same incentive structure. For 
example, provincial officials are not “local officials” in a strict sense because though 
provincial leaders are the local supervisors immediately under the central government, 
many of them hold central positions simultaneously, like seating in the Politburo, or the 
Central Committee of the CCP. This arrangement demonstrates that they are under tight 
political control by the central government and share more common interests with the 
Center than lower level officials. Therefore, the behavior patterns of provincial officials 
with regards to local economic affairs cannot be applied to lower levels’ officials.  
Finally, prefecture-level governments enjoy more discretionary power over local 
industry policymaking than county level governments. Also, municipal city leaders have 
authority in managing fixed investment, land development, price setting for land lease, 






1.6 The Structure of the Dissertation 
In this introductory chapter, I first discuss the empirical puzzle, and then outline the 
research question driving this project and offer my theory. I also address the theoretical 
contributions of my study and its methodology.  
The property rights protection in China to a large degree results from a bargaining 
game between private investors and local officials conditioned under the political and 
personnel control system. The next chapter provides the theoretical model for arguments 
made throughout subsequent chapters. I first briefly review the existing literature on the 
Chinese economic miracle and commitment problem. Then I examine the dual nature of 
Cadre Evaluation System (CES) and political control system that determine a local 
official’s career with a brief review of the competing views on the effects of CES on 
economic growth. With their one-sided conclusions, previous studies are unable to tell on 
what conditions the CES can provide property rights protection (constrain or induce 
property rights predatory behaviors). I suggest a bargaining game under the principal-
agent model by looking into how the CES shapes the prospect of further promotion of 
local officials—the most important incentives of Chinese officials. I conclude this chapter 
by arguing that the resources and constraints behind the bargaining power of private 
investors and local officials could provide property rights protection from rational choice 
perspective. 
Chapter 3 discusses the bargaining game between private investors and local officials 
with focus on the examination of the private sectors’ resources and argues that a private 
firm’s features determine its post-entry bargaining power with local officials and 
therefore affect local officials predatory behaviors over private property rights. Finally, 
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this chapter provides two types of empirical evidence to test the proposed hypotheses 
quantitatively. 
Chapter 4 examines the bargaining game under principal-agent model with focus on 
local officials’ resources and argues that native local officials with fewer connections and 
more constraints have weakened bargaining power in relation to the local private sector 
and therefore are more likely in protecting private property rights in exchange for their 
support. In other words, all else being equal, native local political leaders who have less 
chance to be promoted in the power hierarchy have lower transaction costs, face more 
social constraints, and gain extra benefits in establishing symbiotic relationship with local 
private entrepreneurs and therefore tend to protect private property rights more than those 
transferred ones. This chapter also tests the proposed hypotheses by providing systematic 
empirical evidence from Guangdong province both cross-sectionally and over time by 
investigating the characteristics of 263 prefecture-level local political leaders between 
1992 and 2008, and find that native political leaders promoted substantially higher level 
of private investment—the proxy for the protection of private property rights. The results 
are robust to various alternative specifications, including a model that accounts for 
heterogeneous regional characteristics, initial economic conditions, and socioeconomic 
factors.  
Chapter 5 studies local industry policymaking in Xiamen. This detailed case study 
shows how local industry policymaking affects property rights protection. More 
importantly, it examines how policy choices of local officials in consideration of 
officials’ promotion endeavor conditioned with their resources (no connection). It 
demonstrates that other things being equal, compared with transferred officials, native 
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local officials with less resources are more likely to promote private sector hence increase 
the level of property rights protection.  
In the sixth and concluding chapter, I reiterate my theory of political economy of 
property rights with main empirical findings. Then I provide several general conclusions 






LOCAL OFFICIALS, INCENTIVE STRUCTURE, AND SECURE PROPERTY 
RIGHTS  
This chapter starts from a brief review of the property rights and commitment problem 
and locates the contribution that this research hopes to make to existing literature. I then 
provide a game-theoretical explanation under principal-agent framework for arguments 
made throughout subsequent chapters by examining the Cadre Evaluation System (ganbu 
kaohe zhidu), which determines local officials’ careers through appointment, promotion, 
tenure, and removal from the 1980s to present. This is followed by a discussion of term 
limits and the rotation system in Chinese bureaucratic system. These systems are very 
powerful, because they have shaped local officials’ behaviors, incentives, and ways of 
pursuing the benefits contained in the incentive structure. Following the theoretical 
framework, I propose a bargaining game between local officials and private investors 
under the principal-agent relationships and show how resources and constraints of both 
parties have affected the bargaining power, which determines the security of property 
rights at local level. The following chapters will be empirical studies and a case study to 
test the major hypotheses. 
2.1 The Existing Studies of Property Rights  
The current literature identifies several solutions to the credible commitment 
problem in countries without the rule of law. Theoretically speaking, the authoritarian 
system is a big problem for potential investors who are concerned about political risks.
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But dictators with a long time-horizon have incentive to improve economic institutions 
for sustainable tax revenues (Olson 1993; 2000; McGuire and Olson 1996). However, 
dictators are under constant threats from their challengers and always worry about 
immediate political concerns (Svolik 2012; Wintrobe 1998). In the case of China, 
political leaders face constant factional power struggle as a result of party-state system 
where “collective leadership” rather a single dictator is in charge. Moreover, the 
introduction of compulsory retirements in 1980s and the rotation system in 1990s 
significantly shorten political leaders’ time-horizon and produced shortsighted behaviors. 
Similarly, some scholars suggest that political institutions like legislatures, 
parties, and even elections could work in a way to credibly constrain the dictator’s 
predatory actions (Gandhi 2008a; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). The logic is that these 
formal institutions can help enhance governance, addressing the commitment problem by 
imposing self-constraints. These institutions have been served as political signals making 
a credible commitment to potential investors that their investment will not be easily 
expropriated one day in the future (Gehlbach and Keefer 2009; Magaloni 2008; Myerson 
2008; Svolik 2012). Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) provide other examples and build a 
theory of a non-democratic government that is accountable to a selectorate, a small group 
that has the power to determine the fate of the incumbent. 
However, empirical studies show authoritarian countries with these institutions do 
not perform well economically than countries without such institutions (Gandhi 2008b; 
Wright 2008). This is especially the case in China, where the Party-state has enjoyed 
unprecedented economic growth for the past three decades without the rule of law and 
aforementioned institutions. More importantly, China’s contemporary history 
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demonstrates no institutions really deter the Party to honor its promises to its supporters 
and population as it kept breaking its promises through a series of ideological campaigns. 
Another way to solve the credibility problem is to rely on an exogenous 
commitment device that raises the costs of expropriation. These mechanisms neither 
require the rule of law nor a stable polity. What they require is credible threats of 
retaliation by investors (Haber et al. 2003). Scholars show how autocratic rulers enforce 
property rights selectively as a private good (Greif 2006; Haber et al. 2003, Robinson 
2003; Treisman 2003). Both Robinson (203) and Treisman (2003) illustrate how these 
rulers used divide-and-rule strategies, trading the property rights protection of private 
owners for political support. Greif (2006) argues how the commitment problem can be 
solved through reputation or collective reputation, while Haber et al. (2003) focus on the 
third-party enforcement. However, these credible threats may only work in the countries 
where the government is weak and unstable. In countries like China, neither intervention, 
nor financial hostage, nor the third party can be placed upon it.  
As China has achieved the amazing economic miracle for almost four decades, 
several explanations have been offered to explain how China has been able to overcome 
its institutional deficiencies and make credible commitments to investors. A popular view 
is to attribute economic development to market-reform policies and institutional changes 
since 1978 (Shirk 1993; Huang 2008). It has been, for example, argued that fiscal 
decentralization has created an environment for local governments to protect local 
businesses, and hence to promote economic growth. That is, to compete for investment 
with other localities, each local government has an incentive to demonstrate credible 
commitment to maintaining an environment favorable to economic growth. In other 
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words, the competition among local governments for revenue growth could help to limit 
government’s predatory behavior in China (Oi 1992; 1999; Montinola et al. 1995; Qian 
and Weingast 1997).6 
While fiscal decentralization provides useful insights on the commitment problem 
in China, it cannot explain why there exists tremendous regional variations in economic 
growth. Empirical studies suggest great variations among local governments in their 
attitudes towards the private sector, which can be developmental and predatory at the 
same time (Blecher and Shue 2001; Saich 2002; Tsai 2003). In particular, these studies 
did not elaborate why private entrepreneurs view the political and policy signals as 
credible in the face of frequent ideological swing between “socialism” and “capitalism.” 
In fact, we have little knowledge about why some private firms enjoy better property 
rights protection than others under similar political and economic institutional conditions, 
and why some local officials in some localities are more likely than their counterparts to 
support the private sector and protect private property rights. 
More importantly, fiscal extraction at local levels can be worked in a way of 
property rights expropriation by local government. This is especially the case after the 
fiscal reform of 1990s, which has greatly weakened local government’s ability to 
implement policy tasks set from above (Tao and Yang 2008; Yang 2006). Local 
governments are under tremendous pressure and actively pursue extra-budgetary revenue 
in the disguise of fees and fines from private sector to satisfy the policy tasks from 
higher-level governments due to their limited autonomy in local taxes and revenues for 
local development.  
                                                          
6 Qian and Weingast (1997) called this arrangement as Chinese style market-preserving federalism, while Oi (1999) 
called the emergence of non-state enterprises as the result of local state corporatism.  
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Unlike the top-down perspective, other literature focuses on coping strategies of 
the private entrepreneurs or local officials to bypass the restrictions imposed by the 
unfavorable formal institutional setting (Tsai 2007), such as “wearing a red hat” by 
private firms whereby private businesses disguised themselves as collective firms (Oi and 
Walder 1999; Tsai 2007), raising funds via underground finance (Tsai 2002), and 
participating in politics to obtain political patronage (Li et al. 2006).  
One line of argument focuses on social networks or flexible clientelism that has 
been used to substitute for legal protection and to secure business opportunities for 
foreign and domestic investors (Wank 1999; Wang 2002; Tsai 2002; Nee and Opper 
2012). However, these arguments tend to overemphasize the rent-seeking relationship 
between local political actors and private sector actors. In addition, the coping strategies 
and informal connections that provide the mechanism to overcome the commitment 
problem with regards to private property rights are unstable and may easily fall apart. 
Furthermore, these informal coping strategies might have worked in the early years of the 
Reform era, but as the Reform has gone deeper, especially the privatization in 1990s and 
the clarification and lawmaking of private property rights in 2000s, private firms with 
these strategies found themselves in big trouble. Empirical evidence in Chapter 3 
demonstrates that “red hat” firms are easily involved in property rights disputes with 
local government, and therefore are more vulnerable to government-related property 
rights expropriations. 
The emerging literature suggests that local governments are not homogenous in 
responding to the incentives created by the central government (Whiting 2001; Segal 
2003; Donaldson 2011). To explain regional variation, many scholars studied different 
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local geographical conditions and other social and cultural features in explaining the vast 
variation in local economic performance (Liu 1992; Parris 1993; Forster 1990). However, 
these accounts mainly focus on inter-province variation, which cannot explain the vast 
intra-provincial variation. Still other researchers emphasize the importance of historical 
legacy, such as patterns of state investment inherited from the past (1950-1978), working 
together with other institutional and non-institutional factors, in shaping the incentives, 
capacities, and constraints of economic actors after 1978 (Qian and Xu 1993; Whiting 
2001; Oi 1995; Xu and Zhuang 1998; Yang 1996; Perry and Wong 1985). But this 
literature cannot explain variations at the same locality over time. In addition, some 
empirical works suggest great variations among local governments with regards to the 
private sector, which can be developmental, corporatist, entrepreneurial, and predatory 
(Blecher and Shue 2001; Saich 2002; Tsai 2003). 
Another influential explanation for inter-provincial variation examines personnel 
control systems designed by the central government to direct local government officials 
to promote economic growth. Huang (1996) argues that despite economic 
decentralization, the central government’s control over personnel allocation plays a 
critical role in its ability to control local investment and thus runaway inflation (Huang 
1996). This line of empirical work argues that the chances for a provincial leader to be 
promoted to a higher-level position are significantly and positively correlated with the 
GDP growth rate of the local official’s jurisdiction (Li and Zhou 2005). However, these 
findings have been challenged. One group of scholars, for instance, demonstrate that 
personal connections associated with factional competition in the central government 
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play a critical role in promotion and therefore encourage economic growth in their 
jurisdictions (Cai and Traisman 2006; Shih 2004; Shih et al. 2012). 
The incentive structure designed by the central government in the CES does play 
a role in influencing local officials’ behavior towards economic growth. But the CES 
alone does not solve the commitment problem and protect the property rights. This line of 
argument assumes that local officials under the CES will automatically protect private 
property rights. However, it isn’t necessarily the case. In particular, as this study will 
show, local officials under the CES with different resources and constraints may behave 
very differently with regards to private sector. 
Also, self-interested and promotion-oriented local leaders tend to pursue their 
own political goals in addition to the policy targets listed in the CES, taking advantage of 
asymmetric information they possess over the upper level governments. To make the 
situation even worse, local leaders may collude with private firms at the expense of the 
government, as corruption in the form of theft indicates (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). 
More importantly, local officials as individuals may have goals different from 
those of the local governments they serve. Under the current institutional arrangements, 
local leaders possess a great deal of discretionary power, thus allowing them to pursue 
their own political and economic interests strategically in dealing with private 
investment. As a result, individual local officials rather than the governments (central or 
local) become a major source of uncertainty for private firms in China. Thus, how local 
government disciplines and monitors local officials’ behavior becomes a critical issue in 




2.2 The Nature of the Cadre Evaluation System 
The Cadre Evaluation System (CES) is widely believed to be an incentive structure 
designed by the central government to help control local officials in the administrative 
hierarchy. The CES is one of the most important government personnel control systems 
in China. It assesses local party and government leaders based on performance criteria set 
by their immediate superior level of government. The CES powerfully shaped the 
behavior of Chinese local officials by linking both monetary interests and promotion 
incentive to their performance on the tasks listed in the system.   
Before the Reform Era, the most important factor that determines Chinese political 
actors’ promotion is political royalty or political affinity (Zhong 2003).  In addition to 
political affinity, three new elements were introduced to the evaluation process since the 
Reform Era. Officials have to be of a young age, have good education, and above all, 
have the ability to promote local economic growth. The last one has become one of the 
most important criteria for higher-level officials to assess the work of their subordinates 
(Bo 2002; Huang 1996; Landry 2008; Shih 2004; Li & Zhou 2005). 
Also, as the study of factionalism in Chinese politics, social connections are believed 
to play a critical role in one’s promotion (Nathan 1973; Dittmer 1995; Zhong 2003; Shih 
2004; Bo 2007; Shih et al. 2012). If so, the question then become whether economic 
growth still matters for promotion once social connections are account for (Opper and 
Brehm 2007; Shih et al. 2012). Some scholar argue that the connections and economic 
growth are complements for political leader’s promotion (Jia 2012). At any rate, if a local 
leader has social connections with his/her superiors, he/she will become a strong 
candidate and his/her promotion prospect will be significantly enhanced. Since political 
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affinity is easily to perform and has become less important during the Reform Era, it is 
safe to say that four important factors determine the prospect of local officials’ 
promotion.  
The decentralization process of China’s personnel management has transformed 
the personnel control system from “two-level down” to “one-level down” administrative 
hierarchy. Under the current system, the CES operates in a one-level down fashion 
(O’Brien and Li 1999; Landry 2008).
 
That means each level of local government has full 
authority to evaluate the leading officials of the immediate subordinate level. For 
example, provincial governments have full authority to assess prefectural party 
secretaries or mayors without approval from the central organization departments. 
Prefectural governments and county governments are authorized to evaluate their 
immediate subordinate level of party secretaries and heads of government without 
seeking approval from higher-level organization department. Working in this way, the 
final decisions are actually made in a centralized way by a handful of people leading the 
party committee at each level. Therefore, local political leaders enjoy a great deal of 
leeway to pursue their own objectives in appointing local leaders (Wang 2013). 
Some scholars argue that the discretion of local leaders is an unintended 
consequence of the CES due to conflicting priorities or due to the moral hazard problem 
inherent in a principal-agent relationship between central and local governments (Edin 
2003; O’Brien and Li 1999; Whiting 2001; 2004). O’Brien and Li’s (1999) study shows 
that local officials possess a certain amount of discretionary power to implement policy 
selectively in accordance with their own preferences. By studying governments at the 
prefecture and county levels, Wang (2013) argues that in addition to the top-down 
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control, the CES is also characterized by a high degree of local autonomy that enables 
local leaders to bargain with the higher-level government over the specifics of evaluation 
standards.    
With regards to the commitment problem, the central government has a strong 
incentive to keep its promise on private investment, but it is not easy to fulfill the task 
without local governments’ compliance. Because local autonomy is inherent in the CES, 
local officials have choices to formulate local policies and implement policies selectively 
to suit their own goals. Moreover, officials at various levels of government may behave 
differently in accordance with the resources they have in the face of the same incentive 
structure.  
2.3 Term Limits and Rotation System 
In addition to the CES, two more systems have been introduced to be a 
mechanism in shaping incentives, capacities, and constraints of local political officials. 
Since the 1990s, China has developed a control system that intends to solve the problem 
of asymmetric information, shirking, and monitoring. Both term limits and the cadre 
rotation system are expected to serve the purpose of aligning divergent preferences and 
reducing asymmetric information. The two systems largely shorten the career horizon of 
local leaders and many economic targets are often out of control of the local officials, and 
the provision of local public goods has reinforced the revenue extraction pressure facing 
local leaders.7  
The system of compulsory retirements was introduced in 1982. The main feature 
of the system is to set the age limits to retirement for local officials. The practice on 
                                                          
7 Susan H. Whiting, Power and Wealth in Rural China: The Political Economy of Institutional Change, (Cambridge 
University Press, 2001). p. 72 
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mandatory stepping down at age 65 for provincial governors was established. A recent 
policy regulates that for a provincial party secretary, if he/she ends up at the age 63 after 
a five year term, he/she would not be allowed to serve another round. Mayors of 
prefectures are usually required to retire at the age of 60. Under this system, young and 
well-educated officials are favored for further promotion.8  
The rotation system was originally to rotate provincial officials across provinces 
and positions beginning in 1990. For some reasons, there was a different policy before 
1990, which encouraged localization of governors (Zhang and Gao 2008).9 More 
specifically, the rotation system is expected to prevent tie-cultivation in the hierarchical 
power structure and local protectionism (Chen and Zhao 1996; Blanchard and Shleifer 
2001; Zhong 2003). Those who support the rotation system argue that the system reduces 
corruption and faction formation in local governments (Chen and Zhao 1996) and 
promotes regional economic development (Liu 1998; Pu 1999). Others are skeptical by 
focusing on the negative effect of shortsighted rotated officials on local economic 
development (Gu 2006). The empirical study suggests the positive impact of rotated 
governors on local economic growth in the eastern provinces (Zhang and Gao 2008). 
There are no uniform rules on which who should be included in the rotation 
system. However, it is discouraged that the key local officials, mostly the “first hand”—
the Party secretary, “at the provincial and prefecture levels serve in his or her native 
province and prefecture (Zhong 2003, p. 118).”10 Right now, the governments both 
central and provincial have sped up rotating local officials between localities in order to 
                                                          
8 By the current retirement regulations, if someone cannot be climb to the seat of mayor at 55, his/her further promotion 
prospect is very unlikely. 
9 See Zhang and Gao (2008) for details.  
10  See Zhong (2003) for details. 
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prevent intense tie-cultivation and local protectionism. This system has reinforced the 
short-time pressure for local officials to generate impressive economic growth in only 2 
to 3 years, so as to impress their superiors to win promotion. 
 The local officials face great pressure and incentive to satisfy the policy targets 
assigned by upper level government. This situation on the one hand does motivate better 
performance from the local officials, which helps to explain the rapid growth in the past 
to a large degree. But the pressures also produce other unintended consequences from 
them. Shorter time-horizon in each locality also causes short-term behaviors of local 
officials eager for instant success. Chapter 5 details that local leaders are fanatic in the so 
called “achievement projects,” like investing in a symbolic project in the city at the cost 
of hurting private sector.  
In summary, the CES worked with the term limits system has created a distinct 
career pattern in China’s power hierarchy. First, unlike politicians in democratic regimes, 
in the case of China, once a person becomes a cadre, he/she will enjoy cadre status until 
retirement. He loses his position only when he gives up voluntarily, or becomes a 
convicted felon. Therefore, no mater what job performance he achieved, his position is 
secured as long as he got there. It is very rare to demote an official because he/she did not 
meet the targets assigned by the upper level government. Second, because of the almost 
permanent tenure in an office, there are almost no job options outside the political career 
once you are in (Li and Zhou 2005). Finally, the age limits have been set to compulsory 





2.4 The Theoretical Framework 
In this section, I present a simple bargaining game between a private firm and a local 
official following the literature of the Obsolescing Bargain Model (OBM) and the 
Political Bargaining Model (PBM), which explain bargaining relations between a Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) firm and a host country (Vernon 1971; Eden et al. 2005). The 
major concerns of the multinational corporations’ (MNCs) investment decisions in a 
developing country include the returns on an investment and the political risk associated 
with it.  One of the risks as shown in the Obsolescing Bargain Model is that the initial 
bargain favors the foreign investors, but the bargaining power shifts from MNCs to the 
host countries once the investment is in place. The host governments have incentives to 
impose higher taxes to squeeze FDI firms’ profits or expropriate their assets completely 
by changing policies at any time. The possibility of direct or indirect expropriation is 
often the major political risk for MNCs investing in an authoritarian regime. 
Private firms in China face similar risks as MNCs do in their investment decisions. 
More importantly, in the case of China, domestic private enterprises are the most 
vulnerable in terms of property rights protection as compared to the state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) since the central government 
sets up a package of preferential policies exclusively for the latter types of firms.  As 
discussed in the previous sections, individual local officials rather than the government 
(central or local) become a major source of uncertainty for private firms in China. Under 
the current institutional arrangement, local political leaders possess a great deal of 
discretionary power, allowing them to pursue their own political and economic interests 
strategically in regard to private investment.  
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Before formalizing the bargaining game and the symbiotic logic of secure 
property rights, I identify the players and their preferences as follows. There are three 
players in the local economy, Government (G) is the principal, the local political official 
serves (S) as the supervisor and the Private entrepreneur (P) is the agent. I detach political 
actors from government because the goals of government are not always identical with 
political actors. In the context of China, I identify political actors as local political 
leaders, economic actors as indigenous private entrepreneurs, and government includes 
central and local.  
I make an extremely simple assumption that the goal of government and political 
actors may not be the same. Government (G), both central and local, cares about tax 
revenue and the primary and foremost concern of local political leaders (S) is to stay in 
office and be promoted to a higher rank. The ultimate goal of local officials, however, is 
to acquire more wealth and secure their possessions. In other words, the pursuit of 
political power is the means to achieve the end (wealth acquisition). The old saying 
“shengguan facai” (more power more money)11 demonstrates the logic of career concerns 
with Chinese characteristics. For the indigenous private entrepreneur (P), what he/she 
wants is not only to maximize profit but also to secure property rights. 
There exist nested games between the three players in the local economy. The 
principal-agent problem is inherent between different levels of government, as well as 
between governments, both central and local, and local officials. It is assumed that there 
exist information asymmetries between the government, local political leaders, and 
economic actors. In other words, the activities of local political leaders and economic 
actors cannot be observed by the government, and indigenous private entrepreneurs 
                                                          
11 The old saying Shengguan Facai implies that if the power not for money, why power? 
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cannot perfectly monitor the impact of the government’s actions or policies upon their 
property rights. As Figure 2.1 shows, local political leaders engage in the bargaining 
game with indigenous private investors within the principal-agent relationships between 
the government and local leaders, and upper level leaders and lower level leaders.  
The third assumption I make is that indigenous private entrepreneurs do not 
necessarily demand efficient property rights. In fact, it is not clear that an individual 
private entrepreneur should always demand that the government protect everyone’s 
property rights. According to Haber et al. (2003), an indigenous private entrepreneur can 
receive utility from the secure and efficient property rights, because this makes her asset 
more liquid, and therefore more valuable. However, if selective enforcement grant the 
indigenous private entrepreneur more comparative advantage in the market, then it may 
be more profitable to demand less than universal enforcement. Between these two 
possibilities, it is assumed that indigenous private entrepreneurs care first and foremost 
about their own property rights. Any profit-maximizing actor would readily accept the 
exclusive protection of her property rights, providing that it produced better benefits to 
that actor. 
Finally, the model assumes that local officials are potential predators and private 
investors are their prey. The predator and prey interact strategically in the context in 
which the central government or superiors level officials evaluate the subordinate local 





















Figure 2.1 A Bargaining Game under the Principal-Agent Relationships 
To provide a systematic understanding of the bargaining process between local 
political actors and private sector investors, I will first describe local political actors’ 
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systems. Then, I will discuss private sector investors’ goals and resources in the 
bargaining game with local political leaders. Finally, I delineate the bargaining process 
between local political actors and private sector investors, and propose theoretical 
hypotheses. 
The local political officials’ goals, resources, and constraints 
While both central and local governments hope to accomplish broad social, 
economic and political objectives, local political leaders, in direct contact with private 
firms, may intend to achieve their personal goals through bargaining with private 
investors. One of the major goals of the government at both central and local levels is to 
attract investments, which will generate GDP growth rate, tax revenue, and employment. 
But for many local political leaders, other goals may be involved in dealing with private 
investment.  
The “competition for promotion” literature assumes that the primary goal of local 
political leaders is to be promoted to a higher rank (Li and Zhou 2005). I relax this 
assumption by including economic interests. The local official is thus assumed to be an 
expected utility-maximizer. His/her goals include not only promotion (career concerns) 
but also monetary interests.  
Although it may be clear that the CES plays a significant role in forming a local 
political leader’s preferences, an individual’s background and resources influence his/her 
goals and strategies toward private investment. As discussed in the previous section, three 
elements are important for local officials to be promoted to a higher rank: youth, 
education, and the ability to promote economic growth. Youth became a critical factor in 
determining one’s political career when the age-based mandatory retirement rule was 
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implemented in 1982. So if a local leader is near retirement age, then he/she will have 
nearly zero chance to be promoted despite his/her expertise in local economic growth. As 
a result, his goal towards private investment will not be the same as the goals of those 
who are young and/or well-educated. Quite likely, the near-retiring officials may be more 
interested in monetary fortunes than in prospects for promotion. 
Also, as discussed in previous sections, according to career concern studies, it is 
not clear whether job performance measured by GDP growth rate, political connections, 
or a mix of performance and connections matters most for one’s promotion. From the 
perspective of “faction politics”, those who have connections with provincial leaders, will 
be promoted no matter what job performance they achieved. For those who don’t, there 
are several strategies to maximize their likelihood of promotion, such as bribery to their 
superior or simply buy an office (Zhu 2008). Chapter 4 will show how these resources 
and constraints affect local officials’ behaviors in the bargaining relationship with 
indigenous private investors.    
Private investors’ goals, resources, and constraints 
Private firms in China are more vulnerable than the State-Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs) and Foreign Invested Enterprises (FIEs). The development of the private sector in 
China went through an uneven path of institutional and structural changes. Before 1978, 
private businesses were strictly forbidden. Anyone who ran a private business would be 
severely punished, including being arrested and persecuted. Between 1978 and 1988, the 
private sector was not allowed officially except for “individual entrepreneurs” (getihu) 
engaging in small businesses with less than eight employees. The 1988 regulations 
allowed businesses with more than eight employees to be registered as “private 
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enterprise” (siying qiye), but the Tiananmen Incident of 1989 dashed the inception of 
private businesses. Deng Xiaoping’s “Southern Tour Talk” in early 1992 and the 
introduction of the Company Law in 1993 reignited and accelerated the development of 
the private sector during the 1990’s. However, discrimination against the private sector 
continued until the 1999 Constitutional Amendments accorded private enterprises legal 
status. It was only after the 2004 Constitutional Amendments that lawful private property 
was protected and equal legal status was offered for private firms and state-owned 
enterprises. In 2007, China enacted its first law to explicitly protect private property, but 
it does not provide enough details or effective enforcement mechanisms. 
The major goal of a private sector investor is to secure business opportunities and 
make profits. But if the profits will be expropriated by the government, investors will not 
invest. Therefore, the security of property rights is also under consideration. In general, 
private sector investor’s choice to invest in a particular place is determined by a variety 
of objectives and considerations. Business opportunities, market expansion, social 
networks, tax incentives, fiscal subsidies, cheap land, labor force, and legal environment 
are all factors that private investors will take into account in their investment decisions. 
Which factor is weighted more heavily than others depends very much upon post-entry 
bargaining power, referring to the relative bargaining power vis-à-vis the local 
government after the investment is made. And a private sector investor’s post-entry 
bargaining power is in turn determined by firm specific characteristics and the degree to 
which he/she will need from the local government, such as licensing requirements, 
permissions, resources, domestic market, and public-goods provisions.  
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The literature on international business shows that firm-specific advantages affect 
multinational corporations’ investment decisions in different host countries (Helpman 
1984; Markusen 2002; Hansen et al. 2005; Zheng 2007). In particular, the OBM literature 
indicates that OBM may only be applied to the natural resources sector such as copper 
mining and the oil industry (Vernon 1971; Gilpin 1975), while manufacturing industries 
may be less vulnerable to the risk of expropriation because of their ability to adjust to the 
local environment and to renew production technologies to balance against the erosion of 
bargaining power. Some scholars find that the multinational corporation’s bargaining 
power with the host country does not obsolesce for the high technology sector (Kobrin 
1987), while others suggest that in some capital-intensive manufacturing such as the 
automobile industry, a firm’s ability to establish an industry cluster and its technological 
assets could enhance its bargaining power (Bennett and Sharpe 1979). 
As the critics of OBM question the usefulness of the model, scholars propose the 
political bargaining model (PBM) to revitalize OBM by incorporating post-entry political 
strategies with host government through iterative bargaining (Eden et al. 2005).  The 
PBM argues that the competitive advantage of MNCs comes from their Firm Specific 
Assets (FSAs) or resources “if they are rare, hard to imitate, have no direct substitutes, 
and enable companies to pursue opportunities or avoid threats” (Eden et al. 2005, p. 12).  
In the case of China, as a general rule, labor-intensive, export-oriented 
manufacturing firms and high technology firms enjoy competitive advantage, while 
resource-intensive and local market seeking firms are in a disadvantageous position in 
bargaining with local governments. I will come back to this point and discuss firms’ 
characteristics extensively in Chapter 3.  
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2.5 The Bargaining Game 
Initially, the relative bargaining power favors private investors vis-à-vis local 
officials because, first, local officials are trying to attract investment under the pressure of 
the performance-based evaluation, and second, investors may have other options even for 
resource-intensive firms. After a decision is made, the relative bargaining power may 
shift. That is, once an investor has made firm-specific investment in a locality, his/her 
resources may be held hostage by an opportunistic local official. The local government 
would then be in a position to impose new requirements on the firm, which might more 
than offset the initial incentives. Moreover, in the context of China, private entrepreneurs 
risk not only outright expropriation but also a host of other predatory actions taken by the 
local government in the guise of fines, taxes, and/or “charitable contributions” to 
government-sponsored projects (Nee and Opper 2012). 
However, if a private investor’s post-entry bargaining power is strong, he/she will be 
able to protect his/her bargains. The degree to which the investor will be able to do so 
depends on the level of Firm Specific Assets (FSAs) and the degree to which he/she will 
need from the local government for, say, licensing, permissions, resources, and public-
goods provisions. In particular, private firms with an exit option will enjoy sufficient 
protection because they possess high levels of FSAs.  The outright expropriation of this 
type of firm does no good to the government or to the local political leaders. Political and 
social considerations at both central and local governments with the incentive structure 
embedded in the CES have thus set up relatively stable conditions for these types of 
investment, which appears to facilitate a self-enforcing solution to the commitment 
problem. In this situation, everyone benefits and no one has the incentive to deviate. 
40 
 
On the one hand, both central and local governments have strong incentives to keep 
their promises since these firms can generate higher GDP growth, tax revenue, and 
employment. Although private firms in general may have an incentive to conceal real 
profits and hence decrease the taxes they pay to the government, it is more difficult for 
labor-intensive, export-oriented manufacturing firms and high technology firms to do so.  
On the other hand, due to relatively short tenure in office (e.g., less than three years, 
on average, for local mayors), local officials are under enormous pressure to show their 
ability to produce economic growth quickly (Pei 2012). Thus, local political leaders have 
strong incentives to maintain a collaborative relationship with these firms because it is an 
easy way to demonstrate their job performance. Also, knowing that this type of firm has 
an exit option even if it is expensive for them to do so, and that the worst scenario of 
resistance to predatory actions will severely damage their reputation, local political actors 
will restraint their predatory behavior. 
For investors with rapidly obsolescing post-entry bargaining power, however, there 
is no self-enforcing commitment. Private firms without an exit option such as resource-
intensive and local market seeking firms are in a disadvantageous position to overcome 
the commitment problem.  This type of firms’ FSAs is low as its firm-specific assets are 
common, easy to be imitated and substituted, and hard to transfer. They need more 
government-related resources for their projects. Investors may prefer a better legal 
environment to constrain the predatory activities or rely on personal networks (guanxi) or 
bribing local officials to protect their investments.  
For local officials, the political risk of direct expropriation of private firms without 
an exit option may be low due to the moral hazard problem. For instance, the predatory 
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actions may not be seen as personal. It may be done in the name of the local government. 
In addition, a local official could assign his/her protégé to take over the firm and to run 
the business as usual. After the outright expropriation, the local government still retains 
GDP growth, tax revenue and employment opportunities. Moreover, the local official 
receives private benefits from the outright expropriation as well. No matter who is going 
to take over the firm, the new owner will owe a favor to the official, and will pay back in 
some form of revenue. Therefore, private investors who engage in low-level FSAs 
investments without an exit option will, from time to time, rely on their personal 
networks (guanxi) or bribery to protect their property rights. 
If the local official chooses not to expropriate directly but to be engaged in indirect 
expropriation such as collecting fees, fines, forced apportionment of funds (tanpai), or 
forced contribution of government sponsored projects, the firm with no exit option has 
little bargaining power and has no choice but to give in with either direct payments or 
bribes. In this case, the local official receives both higher merit and private benefits with 
no risk of the exit of the firm. Chapter 3 presents the model that illustrates the prisoner’s 
dilemma situation in the bargaining relationship between local officials and private 
investors, and test the hypotheses statistically. 
Local political leaders’ decision of whether or not prey on the private sector is 
determined by a firm’s resources and constraints. However, as discussed in previous 
section, local officials are also under strict constraints within the personnel control 
systems. If the local official is near 55, or less educated, or has no political connections, 
he/she will desperately need the private sector’s support for political survival. This 
symbiotic relationship between native local political officials and private entrepreneurs 
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creates conditions similar to secure property rights at the local level. The degree of 
symbiotic relationship between the local officials and indigenous private entrepreneurs 
determines the level of private property rights protection.  
Native local officials have lower transaction costs and therefore a symbiotic 
relationship between native local officials and local private firms is easier. Compared to 
rotated local leaders, native local political leaders have more incentives to protect private 
property rights in order to get political and economic benefits as well as none-material 
rewards. I will show how these resources and constraints created by the political control 
systems affect local officials’ behaviors in the bargaining relationship with indigenous 
private investors and test the hypothesis in Chapter 4.   
2.6 Summary  
This chapter briefly reviews the existing studies of property rights with special 
attention on the personnel control systems including the cadre evaluation system, term 
limits, and rotation system, and provides a game theoretical explanation to the property 
rights protection in China. I theorize the endogenous property rights as a bargaining game 
between a private investor and a local official. Resources and constraints of both actors 
affect their bargaining power in the bargaining relationship and hence determine the level 
of property rights protection. Private firms with high levels of FSAs and especially with 
an exit option possess strong post-entry bargaining power, and thus enjoy better property 
rights protection, but weak firms are vulnerable to the local officials’ predatory activities, 
and therefore needs to rely upon other mechanism, such as their social networks or 
bribery, to overcome the commitment problem. 
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Another source that could overcome the commitment problem emerges from the 
symbiotic relationship between the local officials and indigenous entrepreneurs. Native 
local political actors, who are less favorable to the promotion prospect, are more likely to 
protect private property rights. The logic is that compared to transferred officials, native 
local officials have fewer political connections with higher-level officials and therefore 
have less chance to be promoted in the power hierarchy. This condition makes them seek 
the support of local economic actors for their political survival. Moreover, native local 
political leaders who were born in their jurisdiction have lower transaction costs, and 
therefore a symbiotic relationship between native local officials and local private 
entrepreneurs is feasible. The chances were high that the native leaders would have close 
ties to local economic actors and face more strict social constraints; therefore, they were 




THE GAME OF PROPERTY RIGHTS: CREDIBLE COMMITMENT IN CHINA 
This chapter explores the resources and constraints of private firms under the institutional 
arrangements by examining the firms’ characteristics. According to the theoretical 
framework presented in Chapter 2, these conditions will determine the bargaining power 
in the bargaining relationship with local officials in terms of property rights protection. 
Then, I test the effects of firms’ characteristics on the security of private property rights 
quantitatively. 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, I theorize the endogenous property rights as a 
bargaining game between a private firm and a local political actor. I model the 
relationship as a one-shot game with conflicting goals, and hypothesize that a firm is in a 
strong bargaining position at the time of entry when the local official, under the pressure 
of the performance–based evaluation by his or her immediate superiors, understands that 
the firm has other options. However, once the firm has made sector-specific investment, 
its capability to resist the official’s predatory actions relies upon certain firm-specific 
characteristics. More specifically, in the post-entry situation, the availability or 
unavailability of an exit option for a private firm affects the local political actor’s 
behavior with regard to the protection of private property rights. These hypotheses are 
supported by a statistical analysis of a nationwide firm-level survey on privately owned 
enterprises and the data I collected from the media reports of government-related 
property rights expropriation cases. 
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section provides a 
close examination of firms’ resources and constraints created by their characteristics 
under the current institutional arrangements. Section 2 provides a simple bargaining game 
between a private firm and a local official with hypotheses that guide the empirical 
analysis. Then, I present a model that illustrates the dominant strategies for different 
types of private firms and local officials. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 discusses 
the research design and provides empirical tests. Section 6 presents the analysis of media 
reports of government-related property rights expropriation cases. Section 7 concludes. 
3.1 Firms’ Characteristics as a Source of Property Rights Protection 
As the discussion of the Cadre Evaluation System (CES) demonstrates, local 
officials are under the pressure of the performance–based evaluation by their immediate 
superiors. They have to show their ability to accomplish the tasks listed in CES, which 
include Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate, employment creation, and tax 
revenue. Labor-intensive, export-oriented manufacturing firms and high technology firms 
can create more jobs, contribute stable fiscal revenue, and generate higher economic 
growth. All of these are major political tasks on the basis of which local political officials’ 
job performance is evaluated. If these firms choose to relocate their investment elsewhere, 
local governments will lose all the benefits they can get, and local political leaders will 
also fail in cadre evaluation which is closely tied to their future career. As one of the 
fallen local political leaders in Southern China bitterly complains, “Some firms always 
threaten to relocate their headquarters. Let them leave. See if they could move to 
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heaven.”12 Indeed, the availability of an exit option, even if unused, can be a powerful 
tool that greatly enhances a private firm’s bargaining power vis-à-vis local political actors. 
Labor-intensive, export-oriented manufacturing firms even in the period of labor 
shortage can retain their advantage. For example, many Chinese factories have struggled 
to find enough people to operate the assembly lines since the labor shortage first occurred 
in 2004. Labor shortage was so acute in 2012 that it forced many firms to turn to the local 
government for help. However, this does not seem to decrease the bargaining power of 
these private sector actors vis-à-vis the local governments. Rather, in order to attract and 
retain the investment, many local governments promise to help to recruit workers for 
them (Lin 2013).13  
However, if labor-intensive firms in resource-intensive and local market seeking 
sectors, such as mining industry, or steel industry, even if they generate the same benefits 
for local governments as the above-mentioned labor-intensive, export-oriented 
manufacturing firms do, they may lose their advantage. The key factor is that these firms 
have no option to relocate their businesses. If they choose to exit, they will lose all.  
Like labor-intensive, export-oriented manufacturing firms, resource-intensive and 
local market seeking firms can contribute to employment creation, fiscal revenue, and 
economic growth. But this type of firms relies heavily on government-related resources. 
More importantly, without an exit option, local political actors may gain more bargaining 
power over private firms in protecting their properties.  Knowing that these firms have no 
place to relocate their investment, local political actors tend to prey on them as compared 
to those firms with an exit option. 
                                                          
12 See http://news.xinhuanet.com/lianzheng/2014-07/03/c_126703996.htm (accessed July 17,2014).     




Traditionally, capital-intensive firms are vulnerable to political risks because 
these firms involve a large amount of capital for machinery and infrastructure, and 
therefore need longer time to make a profit. But if these capital-intensive firms are in 
labor-intensive, export-oriented manufacturing sector or high technology sector so as to 
provide them with an exit option, they will be able to retain their advantage. If capital-
intensive firms are in resource-intensive sectors, such as oil industry, energy industry, or 
real estate industry, which leave them no option to exit, they will lose their advantage.  
In summary, firms with resources that are hard to substitute in regard to skilled 
labor force, access to foreign market, or technology know-how are considered to be high-
level Firm Specific Assets (FSAs) firms, and will be in a better position to bargain with 
the government. In particular, it is the availability of an exit option that, to a large extent, 
determines the post-entry bargaining power of private sector actors over local political 
actors in protecting their property rights. 
3.2 A Bargaining Game 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the relative bargaining power at the time of entry 
favors private investors vis-à-vis local officials because, first, local officials are trying to 
attract investment under the pressure of the performance-based evaluation, and second, 
investors may have other options even for resource-intensive firms. However, once an 
investor has made firm-specific investment in a locality, the relative bargaining power 
may shift to local officials. In the post-entry situation, his/her investment may be held 
hostage by an opportunistic local official. The local government would then take 
advantage of it so as to impose new requirements on the firm, which might more than 
offset the initial incentives. Moreover, in the context of China, private entrepreneurs risk 
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not only outright expropriation but also a host of other predatory actions taken by the 
local government in the guise of fines, taxes, and/or “charitable contributions” to 
government-sponsored projects (Nee and Opper 2012). 
However, a firm’s specific characteristics can greatly empower its bargaining 
power, and if a private investor’s post-entry bargaining power is strong, he/she will be 
able to protect his/her bargains. The degree to which the investor will be able to resist 
local officials’ predatory actions depends on the level of Firm Specific Assets (FSAs) and 
the degree he/she will need from the local government for, say, licensing, permissions, 
resources, and public-goods provisions.  
As discussed in previous section, private firms with an exit option will enjoy 
sufficient protection because they possess high levels of FSAs.  The outright 
expropriation of this type of firm will hurt the government or affect the local political 
leaders negatively in terms of performance based evaluation measured by real figures like 
tax revenue, employment creation, and GDP growth rate. Political and social 
considerations at both central and local governments with the incentive structure 
embedded in the CES have thus created relatively stable conditions for these types of 
investment, which appears to facilitate a self-enforcing solution to the commitment 
problem. In this situation, everyone benefits and no one has the incentive to deviate. 
Governments, both central and local, have strong incentives to keep their 
promises since these firms can generate higher GDP growth, tax revenue, and 
employment. Although private firms in general may have an incentive to conceal real 
profits and hence decrease the taxes they pay to the government, it is more difficult for 
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high level FSAs firms, such as labor-intensive, export-oriented manufacturing firms and 
high technology firms to do so. 
For local officials, due to relatively short tenure in office (e.g., less than three 
years, on average, for local mayors), they are under enormous pressure to show their 
ability to produce economic growth quickly (Pei 2012). Thus, local political leaders have 
strong incentives to maintain a collaborative relationship with these firms because it is an 
easy way to demonstrate their job performance. Also, knowing that this type of firm has 
an exit option even if it is expensive for them to do so, and that the worst scenario of 
resistance to predatory actions will severely damage their reputation, local political actors 
will restrain their predatory behaviors. 
However, there is no self-enforcing commitment for investors with rapidly 
obsolescing post-entry bargaining power. Private firms without an exit option, such as 
resource-intensive and local market seeking firms, are in a disadvantageous position to 
overcome the commitment problem.  This type of firm’s FSAs is low as its firm-specific 
assets are common, easy to be imitated and substituted, and hard to transfer. They need 
more government-related resources for their projects. Investors may prefer a better legal 
environment to constrain the predatory activities or rely on personal networks (guanxi) or 
bribing local officials to protect their investments.  
More importantly, for local officials, the political risk of direct expropriation of 
private firms without an exit option may be low due to the moral hazard problem. For 
instance, the predatory actions may not be seen as personal responsibility. It may be done 
in the name of the local government. In addition, a local official could assign his/her 
protégé to take over the firm and to run the business as usual. After the outright 
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expropriation, the local government still retains GDP growth, tax revenue and 
employment opportunities. Moreover, the local official receives private benefits from the 
outright expropriation as well. No matter who is going to take over the firm, the new 
owner will owe a favor to the official, and will pay back in some form of revenue. 
Therefore, private investors who engage in low-level FSA investments without an exit 
option will, from time to time, rely on their personal networks (guanxi) or bribery to 
protect their property rights. 
If the local official chooses not to expropriate directly but to be engaged in 
indirect expropriation, such as collecting fees, fines, forced apportionment of funds 
(tanpai), or forced contribution of government sponsored projects, the firm with no exit 
option has little bargaining power and has no choice but to give in with either direct 
payments or bribes. In this case, the local official receives both higher merit and private 
benefits with no risk of the exit of the firm. 
Given the above discussion, I come up with two hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: All else being equal, private firms with an exit option and high 
level of FSAs enjoy sufficient property rights protection. 
Hypothesis 2: All else being equal, private firms with no exit option and low 
level of FSAs are vulnerable to local officials’ predatory activities. 
3.3 The Model 
As noted earlier, the situation in which a resource-intensive and local market 
seeking firm on the one hand, or a labor-intensive, export-oriented manufacturing firm or 
a high technology firm on the other may find itself being treated differently. The major 
difference between the two lies in the fact that the former does not have an exit option 
while the latter does. The situations can be illustrated by the Prisoner’s Dilemma game.  
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The traditional prisoner’s dilemma is a game that shows why two purely 
“rational” individuals might not cooperate, even if it is in their mutual interests to do so. 
In the one-shot game, a private investor and a local official may find themselves in a 
situation very much like the prisoner’s dilemma. Table 3.1 shows the two players’ payoff 
matrix. By cooperate, I mean actors play by the rules. Defect means actors evade the 
rules. In this case, for the firm, evading the rules means the firm conceal real profits so 
that decreases the taxes it pays to the government, as well as it decides to relocate its 
assets. For the local official, evading the rules means he/she preys on the firm ranging 
from outright taking of investment to arbitrary fees and fines collected by the 
government, or forced “charitable contributions” to the government projects.      
Table 3.1 Payoffs of a Private Firm and a Local Official in a One-shot Game 
                     A local official 


















3.1 The situation involving a private firm with low level of FSAs and no exit option 
      Scenario 1:  
In this scenario, suppose that both the firm and the local official choose to comply 
with the rules—explicit or implicit—governing normal market transactions. Then, the 
payoffs of the two players in a one-shot game are as follows. The firm will get net profit 
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B1 after deducting the cost and tax paid to the governments. The local official will get the 
bundle benefits B2 he/she intends to achieve as an official including the policy tasks such 
as GDP growth rate, tax revenue, and employment creation, assigned by higher 
governments for the political survival and the monetary interests consist of wages and 
pensions. 
Scenario 2:  
In scenario 2, suppose that the firm complies with the rules, but the local official 
decides to exploit. The payoffs change to as follows. The firm will get D1, in which net 
profit deducts the loss of property exploited by the local official ranging from part of the 
expected profit to all of the investment as well as many types of fees, fines, and 
“contributions.” The local official will get A2 that includes the bundle benefits plus the 
benefits from the exploitation and deducting the cost of the probability of being caught 
for any wrongdoings with a penalty. Generally, the probability of being caught is very 
small. And the predatory action is often done in the name of the government or the 
“public.” Thus, there is also a moral hazard problem.  
Scenario 3:  
Scenario 3 is the situation in which the firm tries to evade while the local official 
decides to abide by the rules. The payoffs thus become as follows. The firm will get A1 
that includes net profit plus the extra benefits for evading the rules, and deducts the cost 
of the probability of being caught with a penalty.  The local official will get D2, in which 
the bundle benefits deduct the loss of tax revenue and other benefits as a consequence of 




Scenario 4:  
In scenario 4, suppose that both the firm and the local official choose not to 
comply with the rules. The payoffs may then turn out to be as follows. The firm will get 
C1, in which the net profit deducts the loss of property exploited by the local official plus 
the extra benefits for evading the rules, and deducts the cost of the probability of being 
caught with a penalty. The local official will get C2, in which the bundle benefits plus the 
benefits from exploitation for the firm, and deduct the loss of tax revenue and other 
benefits as a consequence of the firm’s choice and the cost of the probability of being 
caught with a penalty. 
The payoff relationship is as following:  
A>B>C>D  
Therefore, each player has a dominant strategy, and the game has an obvious 
solution as follows. 
For the firm, scenario 3 is better than scenario 1 if the extra benefits for evading 
the rules deduct the cost of the probability of being caught with a penalty is bigger than 0.  
Scenario 4 is better than scenario 2 if the extra benefits for evading the rules deduct the 
cost of the probability of being caught with a penalty is bigger than 0. The strategic 
choice made by the firm would be this:   
scenario 3> scenario 1> scenario 4> scenario 2 
For the local official, scenario 2 is better than scenario 1 if the benefits from 
exploitation for the firm deduct the cost of the probability of being caught for any 
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wrongdoings with a penalty is bigger than 0. Scenario 4 is better than scenario 3 if the 
benefits from exploitation for the firm deduct the cost of the probability of being caught 
for any wrongdoings with a penalty is bigger than 0. The strategic choice made by the 
local official would be this:  
 scenario 2> scenario 1> scenario 4> scenario 3 
Thus, if the chances of being caught are sufficiently small, both the firm and the 
local official will choose the dominant strategy that is to evade the rules in the one-shot 
game, and therefore end up in scenario 4. This is a prisoners’ dilemma game. Clearly, in 
the payoff relationship A>D, scenario 1 is better than scenario 4. 
Given that the probability of being caught for the firm is bigger than the firm’s 
extra benefits for evading the rules deducting the level of exploitation by the local official 
and the probability of being caught for the local official is bigger than benefits from 
exploitation for local official deducting the loss of tax revenue and other benefits as a 
consequence of the firm’s choice, or chances of being caught are sufficiently high, the 
choice of complying with the rules by both players will be the “common interest.” Then, 
in an infinitely repeated version of the game, the “common interest” may be realized if 
both players choose to play, for example, a trigger strategy.     
3.2 The situation involving a private firm with high level of FSAs and an exit option 
 
This game is similar to the previous one except that the firm has an exit option, 
that is, as the exploitation becomes intolerable, the firm may opt to leave the market so as 
to minimize the costs. Thus, we need to add additional terms in the payoffs for each 
player under the second and fourth scenarios mentioned above. Let us call this the benefit 
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of exiting for the firm as r, (e.g., recovering the whole or part of the investment and 
receiving potential gains from outside opportunities, minus the loss of relocation) and the 
cost of losing a valuable asset for the firm to stand for as e. Then, the new payoffs are as 
follows. Table 3.2 shows the new payoff matrix for the two players. 
Table 3.2 Payoffs of a Private Firm with an Exit Option and a Local Official in a One-
shot Game 
                     A local official 
A private firm 


















Scenario 2:  
Scenario 2 is the situation where the firm chooses to comply with the rules, but 
the local official decides to exploit. For the firm, it will get the net profit D1 deducts the 
loss of property e exploited by the local official. For the local official, the bundle benefit 
A2 plus the benefits from exploitation and deduct the probability of being caught. 
Scenario 4:  
Scenario 4 is the situation where both the firm and the local official choose not to 
comply with the rules, and the firm also chooses to relocate the investment for recovering 
the severe expropriation. For the firm, the net profit C1 deducts the loss of property e 
exploited by the local official, plus the extra benefits for evading the rules, deduct the 
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probability of being caught, and plus the benefit of exiting r. For the local official, the 
bundle benefits C2 plus the benefits from exploitation, but deduct the loss of tax revenue 
and the loss of other benefits as a consequence of the firm’s choice, the probability of 
being caught and the cost of losing a valuable asset for the firm e. 
Solution:  
As a result, for the firm, scenario 3 is better than scenario 1 if the extra benefit for 
evading the rules is bigger than the probability of being caught, and scenario 4 is better 
than scenario 2 if the extra benefit for evading the rules is bigger than the probability of 
being caught. The strategic choice made by the firm would be this:   
 scenario 3> scenario 1> scenario 4> scenario 2 
For the local official, scenario 1 is worse than scenario 2 if the benefit from 
exploitation for the firm is smaller than the probability of being caught plus the cost of 
losing a valuable asset for the firm, and scenario 4 is worse than scenario 3 if the benefit 
from exploitation for the firm is smaller than the probability of being caught plus the cost 
of losing a valuable asset for the firm. The strategic choice made by the local official 
would be this:   
scenario 2> scenario 1> scenario 3> scenario 4 
That is, if the cost of losing a valuable asset for the firm is sufficiently large, there 
exists a pure strategy equilibrium in which the firm chooses to evade while the local 
official abides by the rules, as scenario 3 demonstrates.  
It is also likely that business transactions for this type of firm may be transparent 
to the extent that it is difficult for them to evade the rules. Consequently, the extra benefit 
57 
 
for evading the rules is 0; so is the probability of being caught. Then, in addition to the 
previous equilibrium, there is another pure strategy equilibrium in which both players 
abide by the rules, as scenario 1 shows. 
At any rate, both scenarios indicate the better property rights protection, which 
addresses the commitment problem at the local level. The two games demonstrate that 
firms’ characteristics affect the local officials’ behavior with regards to their treatment of 
the private firms.  
3.4 Data 
The quality of data is a major challenge for studies on the political economy of 
contemporary China since local officials can easily manipulate the statistics. In this study, 
I rely upon two kinds of evidence. The first type of data comes from a nationwide survey 
of private firms conducted in 2012 jointly by the All-China Federation of Industry and 
Commerce (ACFIC), the State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC), the 
United Front Work Department (UFWD), and the Institute of Chinese Private Economy 
at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). Appendix A discusses the survey in 
detail and the potential weaknesses. The survey collected information on 4,747 firms 
from thirty-one provinces. Since there are some missing responses for almost every 
question, I kept only 3,397 observations in which data on basic financial indicators, such 
as sales revenue and total number of employees, were available. 
The second type of data we use is the media reports of government-related 
property rights expropriation cases involving local officials and private firms, which were 
collected from major news media in China. Appendix B provides more information on 
the collection of cases in greater detail and the limitations of our cases. 
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3.5 Empirical Test and Research Design 
 In this section, I test hypotheses generated from the model by analyzing the data 
of a nationwide survey of private firms in 2012. I first discuss the research design and 
variables, and then I present the main empirical results.  
Research Design 
Before I precede the analyses of empirical evidence, I first discuss briefly my 
main dependent variable—government-related property rights expropriation. Basically, 
there are two types of predatory actions that may be taken by local political actors: direct 
and indirect taking of property. Direct taking of property can take various forms, ranging 
from outright nationalization on a sectoral basis to the seizure of land or a firm by the 
government to outright confiscation of the property.14 In the case of China, indirect 
expropriations are a common practice manipulated by local officials, which may involve 
arbitrary fees and fines collected by local government, or “charitable contributions” to 
government-sponsored projects (Nee and Opper 2012). In my statistical analysis of firm-
level survey, I use arbitrary fees and fines collected by local government as a proxy to 
measure the level of local political actors’ predatory actions. As for the media reports of 
government-related property rights expropriation cases, the 279 expropriation cases I 
documented between 1992 and 2010 are exclusively direct taking of property.  
 Following existing literature, I use one indicator to measure my dependent 
variable—the level of local political actors’ predatory actions (Nee and Opper 2012). 15 
First, I use the information on all sorts of arbitrary fees and fines collected by local 
                                                          
14 Zheng (2007) in his study on FDI discusses expropriation and creeping expropriation according to UNCTAD 2003 
(p.65). 
15 Donations (juanzeng) may be considered as an indicator of government-related property rights expropriations. 
However, it is hard to distinguish which donation was voluntarily contributed by the firms or forced to pay. 
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government in addition to taxes in 2011. Then I created a new variable coded as ratio-
fees, which calculates the proportion of arbitrary fees and fines collected by local 
government on firm’s total sales revenue. Arbitrary fees and fines is a perfect indicator of 
government-related property rights expropriations because firms must pay these fees and 
fines at the local level even though the central government has issued several orders to 
stop them.16 
 The key independent variable is the firm characteristics. What I am looking for is 
the availability of exit option a firm has. The survey listed eighteen industry sectors and 
asked firm owners what sector your firm’s business is in. The full list of industry sectors 
in the survey includes agriculture such as farming, forestry, livestock husbandry, and 
fishing, mining, manufacturing, energy such as electricity, gas, and water, construction, 
transportation, information services, retail, hotel & restaurant, finance, real estate, rental 
& commercial services, science & technology, public infrastructure, resident services, 
education, public health, and culture & sports. There is one sector named others, which 
means that firms are not clearly specified their business type in the survey thus I am not 
able to identify the availability of exit option. Therefore, I omitted this sector in my study. 
Also, it is worth noting that firms in manufacturing sector include both those have an exit 
option and no exit option.17  Finally, I choose agriculture sector as the baseline category 
in the model.  
                                                          
16 The “three disorders” or sanluan (improper levying of fees, arbitrary fines, and forced apportionment of funds) have 
long been major harassments to private firms’ operating business acted by local government. The central government 
has issued several orders to stop them since 1990s. The forced apportionment of funds (tanpai) may be considered as 
another indicator of government-related property rights expropriations. However, there are two problems in using this 
measurement. First, it has large proportions of missing responses, and zero response in the data set.  Also, we run a 
regression to test and found tanpai is highly correlated with owners’ political background. All of these suggest this 
variable may be better indicator of political connections of firm rather than local political actor’s predatory actions. 
17 Firms I classified into category of firm without an exit option follow one simple principle that if the firm is mobile. If 
the firm’s production factor cannot be move out no matter how much it costs, then the firm was coded as firm without 
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 A host of control variables, mainly including economic conditions and variables 
both at firm and entrepreneur levels, are also involved in the model (Dickson 2008). With 
respect to economic conditions, I first use firm’s postcode to identify which province a 
firm is in. Then I code the top ten GDP per capita provinces as a rich region and the 
lowest 10 as a poor region according to the China Statistical Year Book of 2012. Finally, 
I created the first dummy variable Region1 identifying whether a firm belongs to a rich 
province (rich=1, otherwise=0). The second dummy Region2 was created to capture 
whether a firm belongs to a poor province (poor=1, otherwise=0).  
Firm-level variables include firm size measured by the total number of employees 
in 2011, and the historical ties between the sample firm and the local government of its 
locality measured by a binary variable indicating whether the firm was transformed from 
an SOE.  
At the entrepreneur level, I control for firm owners’ political backgrounds, 
measured by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and minor Democratic Party membership, 
a binary variable indicating whether owners used to be public officials, and a dummy 
variable indicating whether owners are legislative members including members of 
People’s Congress and People’s Political Consultative Conference at both national and 
local levels. I also control for entrepreneurs’ education attainment.  
Table 3.3 provides a statistical summary for all variables. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
an exit option. However, the firm with exit option is not that easy to classify because the costs will be take into account. 
For example, a firm in manufacturing or hotel & restaurant sector may have an exit option but with heavy costs. 
Therefore, I classified firms with an exit option only conditioned with slightly costs, such as firms in IT services. Those 
with heavy costs fell into the third category. 
61 
 
Table 3.3 Statistical Description of Variables 
  
                                                    Obs.         Mean           Std. Err.       Min.     Max. 
Firm level 
     Ratio-fee 3784 0.0302384 0.2294989 0 11.76471 
Arbitrary fees and fines 4031 66.44514 485.6483 0 19041 
Total sales revenue in 2011 4691 14271.65 134599.8 0 6761939 
Numbers of employees in 
2011 4952 218.5971 1135.873 0 53000 
Former SOE status 4988 0.058741 0.2351628 0 1 
      Entrepreneur level 
     Education 4980 3.949799 1.116389 1 6 
CCP membership 4886 0.3401555 0.4738098 0 1 
Democratic party 
membership 4886 0.3964388 0.4892076 0 1 
Legislative member 4835 0.422544 0.4940152 0 1 
Former government official 4861 0.3953919 0.488985 0 1 
      
 
Source: Survey on Privately Owned Enterprises in China, 2012 (see Appendix A) 
Note: The unit for all financial variables is 10.000 RMB yuan. 
 
Main Empirical Results 
I employ a simple linear regression model to estimate the effects of firms’ 
characteristics on the level of local political actors’ predatory actions on firms’ property 
rights. Table 3.4 presents main empirical results. Using the proportion of arbitrary fees 
and fines collected by local government on firm’s total sales revenue as the dependent 
variable, after controlling for economic conditions and firms’ and entrepreneurs’ 
backgrounds, I find the value of R-square is quiet low, suggesting arbitrary fees ad fines 
are not that arbitrary as the public has perceived. However, two sectors indeed show 
some unfair treatment with regards to arbitrary fees and fines. Mining and construction 
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industry has a significant and positive effect on the proportion of arbitrary fees and fines 
collected by local government on firm’s total sales revenue, suggesting if a firm has no 
exit option, then this firm had higher arbitrary fees and fines collected by local 
government. Mining industry is clearly a resource-intensive sector and construction 
industry is a local market attached sector. These two industries share the same feature of 
no exit option. A firm in either these two sectors if choose to relocate its business will 
lose everything; therefore it is more likely to be subjected to local political actors’ 
predatory actions.  
Table 3.4 OLS Regression Results 
                                     The proportion of arbitrary fees on firm’s total sales revenue   





























Real Estate 0.12 
 
（0.904） 
























(rich=1, other=0) （0.305） 
Region2 0.96 
(poor=1, other=0) （0.336） 
Number of employees 0.01 
 
（0.995） 
Former SOE status -0.54 
(yes=1, no=0) （0.589） 
CCP membership 0.07 
(yes=1, no=0) （0.947） 
Democratic Part membership -0.8 
(yes=1, no=0) （0.426） 
Legislative mebers 0.87 
(yes=1, no=0) （0.386） 
Former officials 2.15** 
(yes=1, no=0) （0.032） 






  N 3300 
R2   0.0097 
F-value 1.23 
 
Notes: p-values are in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
Among the control variables, firm owner’s political background has a significant 
and positive effect on arbitrary fees and fines collected by local government. Firm 
owner’s education attainment has a significant and negative effect on the proportion of 
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arbitrary fees and fines collected by local government on firm’s total sales revenue. This 
means that if a firm owner’s education level is lower, then the firm had higher arbitrary 
fees and fines collected by local government. In other words, the level of firm owner’s 
education attainment affects local political actors’ predatory actions on its firms’ property 
rights. 
In general, the regression results confirm the theoretical predictions. The positive 
correlation between the availability of firm’s exit option and the level of local political 
actors’ predatory actions on this firm suggests firm’s characteristics have a far-reaching 
influence on local political actors’ predatory behaviors. Since the firms without exit 
option have no place to move out their business, this feature greatly weakens the private 
firms’ post-entry bargaining power vis-à-vis local political actors and makes firms 
vulnerable to the local officials’ predatory activities, and therefore need to rely on other 
mechanisms, such as social networks or bribery, to overcome the commitment problem. 
3.6 Analysis of Media Reports of Property Rights Expropriation Cases 
This empirical investigation relies on media exposure of government-related 
property rights expropriation cases involving local officials and private firms. I 
documented a total of 279 cases based on news reports from major newspapers, 
magazines and news portals in China.  Appendix B discusses the collection of cases in 
greater detail and the limitations of the cases. 
That being said, the 279 cases we documented between 1992 and 2010 are 
adequate to test the two hypotheses: (1) private firms with a high level of FSAs and an 
exit option, such as labor-intensive, export-oriented manufacturing firms, and high 
technology firms, enjoy sufficient property rights protection; and (2) private firms with a 
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low level of FSAs and no exit option, such as resource-intensive and local market seeking 
firms are vulnerable as the targets of local officials’ predatory activities.  
As table 3.5 shows, 243 out of 279 outright expropriation cases are in the energy 
industry (including the coal industry, petroleum industry, and electrical power industry), 
14 in real estate development, 14 in manufacturing industry, 4 in transportation and 
construction, and 4 in the retail and service industry. A total of 92.12% of outright 
expropriations are resource-intensive and local market seeking firms, a result confirming 
my hypotheses.  




Cases (%) 1988-1998 1999-2010 
Energy Industry 243 (87.10%) 0 243 
Real Estate Development 14 (5.02%) 2 12 
Manufacturing 14 (5.02%) 4 10 
Transportation and Construction 4 (1.43%) 2 2 
Retail and Service 4 (1.43%) 0 4 
Total 279 (100.00%) 8 271 
Source: Compiled by author. 
My cases also reveal that the number of government-related expropriations has 
increased sharply in the natural resources sector after 1999. This may have something to 
do with the national government’s change of policies toward the coal mining and oil 
industries since the 1990s. Before 1999, both the central government and the various 
provincial governments encouraged private investment in the coal mining and oil drilling 
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industries. Afterwards, the national government decided to take over or shut down small 
mines and drilling firms in the name of mining safety or the restructuring of the oil 
industry. The process of nationalization on these two natural resource sectors provided 
opportunities for local governments to engage in direct expropriation or creeping 
expropriation activities.  As a result, a large number of property rights disputes has 
stemed from the policy changes in coal mining and oil sectors.  
Due to the nature of government-related property rights expropriation in the coal 
mining and oil industries, I exclude the cases in the energy industry to test the hypotheses. 
As shown in table 3.6, 38.89% of expropriation cases are in the manufacturing industry, 
and a total of 61.11% of expropriations are resource-intensive and local market seeking 
firms, again confirming our hypotheses. 
Table 3.6 Media Exposure of Government-Related Property Rights Expropriations  





Cases (%) 1988-1998 1999-2010 
Real Estate Development 14 (38.89%) 2 12 
Manufacturing 14 (38.89%) 4 10 
Transportation and Construction 4 (11.11%) 2 2 
Retail and Service 4 (11.11%) 0 4 
Total 36 (100.00%) 8 28 
Source: Compiled by author. 
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With respect to the manufacturing firms, table 3.7 shows that 7 out of 14 cases 
were “red-hat enterprises”18, 4 involved privatizing SOEs or collective-owned enterprises 
(COEs)19, and 3 were in the food industry. Among the food-manufacturing cases, one 
was related to land acquisition, in which the local government used forced eviction to 
seize the factory building for real estate development; and another involved the 
crackdown on “organized crime” in Chongqing, in which the private entrepreneur was 
sentenced to capital punishment with a penalty of 100 million RMB. Although these food 
firms can be characterized as labor-intensive manufacturing firms, they are all local 
market seeking with a low degree of FSAs. My cases show that there are no government-
related appropriation cases involving labor-intensive, export-oriented manufacturing 
firms, and high technology firms.   







Red-hat 7 (50%) 
Restructuring SOEs or COEs 4 (28.57%) 
Food Industry 3 (21.43%) 
Total 14 (100.00%) 
          Source: Compiled by author. 
                                                          
18 The red-hat enterprises are private firms in which those owners disguised their private ownership and registered as 
public-owned firms in the early years of market transition in order to evade the “eight employees” restriction. As 
discussed in section 4.2, between 1978 and 1988, private businesses were not allowed officially except for “individual 
entrepreneurs” (getihu) with less than eight employees. For details of this literature see Chen (2007). 
19 The collective-owned enterprises mainly refer to Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs). According to Tian 
(2000), a Chinese collective enterprise is characterized by two main features: property rights are vaguely defined and 
there is significant involvement of government officials. 
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Summarizing the cases of government-related property rights expropriation, it is 
evident that labor-intensive, export-oriented manufacturing firms, and high technology 
firms enjoy sufficient property rights protection, and resource-intensive and local market 
seeking firms are vulnerable as targets of local officials’ predatory activities. Therefore, 
the empirical evidence lends support to what I would expect from my model. 
Interestingly, despite the external policy shock imposed on the mining and energy 
industries, my cases still show that the number of government-related expropriations have 
increased sharply after 1999, the turning point in the development of private property 
rights, when the Constitutional Amendments affirmed the legal status of private 
enterprises. The improvement in the legal status of private businesses does not seem to 
offer sufficient protection of private property rights. This provides further evidence to 
support my thesis that local political officials enjoy great leeway in choosing to abide by 
the rules and implement the policies. 
Another interesting phenomenon as shown in these cases is that compared to other 
manufacturing firms, “red-hat” firms are most vulnerable in terms of property rights 
protection. Indeed, it is easy for this type of private entrepreneur to get into a property 
rights dispute with local governments. This happens as a consequence of the very nature 
of this type of enterprise. They are private firms, but their owners disguised their private 
ownership and registered as public-owned firms in the early years of market transition in 
order to evade the “eight employees” restriction. After 1988, when businesses with more 
than eight employees could be registered as private enterprise, many owners of the “red-
hat” firms intended to take off the hat. But since the property rights of such firms were 
vaguely defined, these owners often found themselves in dispute with local governments.  
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The ownership change of manufacturing firms through the privatization of SOEs 
and COEs also makes such firms vulnerable. The issue involved in this kind of property 
rights dispute is the drain on state owned property. The process of privatization in China 
was often accompanied by the drain on state assets because of the agency problem. The 
local government may want to secretly privatize SOEs under its control or even 
encourage spontaneous privatization (Qian 1996). Under such circumstances, local 
officials can easily manipulate the value of the firm and its ownership structure, and 
facilitate the illicit asset transfer of such enterprises (Smyth 2000).20 The problems in the 
process of privatization of SOEs and COEs also set the stage for disputes over property 
rights. 
3.7 Conclusion 
This study provides a game-theoretic model to study the political economy of 
property rights in China, that is, a bargaining game between a firm and a local political 
official following the literature of the Obsolescing Bargain Model.  The model assumes 
that local officials are potential predators and private firms are their prey. The predator 
and prey interact strategically in the context in which the central government evaluates 
the local officials on the basis of the cadre performance evaluation system. 
I identify the mechanisms that may resolve the credible commitment problem. I 
show how the incentive structure provided by the Cadre Evaluation System, together with 
the firm-specific characteristics, results in a relatively stable condition for the protection 
of property rights for private firms. While firms with strong post-entry bargaining power 
enjoy a high level of credible commitment from the local government, weak firms are 
                                                          
20 Smyth (2000) examines the problem of the drain on state assets while Ding (2000) discusses the illicit asset stripping 
of Chinese state firms.  
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vulnerable to the local political officials’ predatory activities, and therefore need to rely 
on other mechanism, such as social networks (guanxi) or bribery, to overcome the 
commitment problem. In particular, the availability of an exit option greatly enhances the 
private firms’ post-entry bargaining power over local political actors in protecting their 
property rights.  
My model demonstrates that private firms without an exit option may find 
themselves in a situation very much like a prisoner’s dilemma in the bargaining 
relationship with local officials. Both the firm and the local official will choose the 
dominant strategy that is to evade the rules in the one-shot game and end up in the worse 
situation, where the firm tries to conceal real profits so that decreases the taxes it pays to 
the government, and the local official tries to exploit the firm. The empirical tests both in 




THE CHINESE STYLE OF SECURE PROPERTY RIGHTS 
This chapter explores the resources and constraints of local political officials created by 
the incentive structure. According to the framework presented in Chapter 2, these 
conditions will have an impact on local political officials’ behaviors in the bargaining 
relationship with indigenous private investors in terms of property rights protection. 
Then, I test the effects of different types of local political leaders on the security of 
private property rights quantitatively.  
The local political leaders protect private property rights when symbiosis between 
local officials and private entrepreneurs is feasible. In this framework, the symbiotic 
relationship between local political officials and private entrepreneurs creates conditions 
similar to secure property rights at the local level. The degree of symbiotic relationship 
between the local officials and indigenous private entrepreneurs determines the level of 
private property rights protection. Lower transaction costs make symbiotic relationships 
feasible, hence increasing the level of property rights protection. A native political leader 
of a locality has lower transaction costs of symbiotic relationship, and therefore 
symbiotic relationship between native local officials and local private firms is easier.  
Using panel data covering detailed information for all political leaders in 21 
prefecture-level cities in Guangdong province between 1992 and 2008, I test the 
hypothesis and find a positive impact on the secure private property rights of native local 
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political leaders. 166 out of 201 political leaders at prefecture-level municipality are 
native. By native, I mean those who were born in Guangdong province. Those who were 
born outside Guangdong province are coded as rotated political leaders. Political leaders 
include both the Party secretary (the first hand) and the Mayor of the municipal cities.  
One common measure used to judge economic development and property rights is 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate or GDP per capita. GDP measurement may 
be a good way to measure the overall economic performance but in an authoritarian 
regime like China, it is not an accurate indicator to measure the development of private 
economy, let alone the security of property rights. I use private investment in fixed assets 
as an indicator to measure the security of property rights. This is a good proxy for the 
security of property rights because this kind of investment requires significant immediate 
costs with only the promise of future revenue. I collect a dataset on private investment in 
fixed assets from 1992 to 2008 in 21 prefecture-level cities in Guangdong province. 
To see if the main results and inferences are robust, I run two models and conduct 
a robust regression. I also conducted the third model, which examines the effects of 
nativity on the proportion of private investment in fixed assets on total investment in 
fixed assets, and the results are even more robust. All of the findings suggest that having 
a native political leader increase private investment substantially.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section sets out a 
theoretical framework with a close examination of local political leaders’ characteristics 
that guides the empirical analysis. Then I describe research design and the dataset. 
Section 4 presents the main empirical results. Section 4 provides robustness checks. 
Section 5 concludes with a summary of the study. 
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4.1 The Theoretical Framework 
As Chapter 3 has shown, local political leaders’ decision of whether or not prey 
on private sector is determined by firm’s resources and constraints. Meanwhile, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, local officials are also under strict constraints within the 
personnel control systems such as the Cadre Evaluation System (CES), the term limits 
system, and the rotation system. If the local official is near 55, or less educated, or no 
political connections, he/she will desperately need private sector’s support for his/her 
political survival. This symbiotic relationship between less favorable to be promoted 
local political officials and private entrepreneurs creates conditions similar to secure 
property rights at the local level. The degree of symbiotic relationship between the local 
officials and indigenous private entrepreneurs determines the level of private property 
rights protection.  
Native local officials have lower transaction costs and therefore symbiotic 
relationship between native local officials and local private firms is easier. Compare to 
rotated local leaders, native local political leaders have more incentives to protect private 
property rights in order to get political and economic benefits as well as none material 
rewards.  
Those local officials who are native face different social constraints from those 
rotated leaders. First, for native prefecture-level officials, they had crafted broad and 
complex personal webs long before they came to this position from a county or township 
level position. Some native local political leaders just don’t want to be promoted to a 
higher rank if that position does not have real authority to utilize resources. As a result, 
they will promote local economy in order to get economic interests, whether for their 
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family businesses or direct money transfers from local firms. They may provide the 
public good of localized property rights protection so that they could get closer 
connections with local economic elites for their own economic interests.  
Second, since the loyalty-based long term relationships and regional affinity are 
crucial in establishing political connections, those native local political leaders who do 
not have connections but want to be promoted have to establish a new political 
connection with provincial leaders. The development of the private sector will serve two 
purposes for native local political leaders. On the one hand, the good performance of 
local private economy proves their ability to promote local economic growth. On the 
other hand, native local political leaders depend on the development of private economy 
because what they have for exchange is local economic resources. They will rely on local 
private firms to provide economic resources to achieve their goal of being promoted.  
Third, from the perspective of local economic actors, market-oriented policy and 
2007 law of property rights are clear signal regarding the central authority’s commitment 
for the development of private economy. But occasional “left” and “right” ideological 
swing and no independent judicial system could not make that commitment credible in 
terms of property rights protection. Predatory activities may come from both public and 
private actors. Having a native local political leader will be an assurance of property 
rights protection because they are weak in comparison to rotated officials. Defective 
behaviors and opportunism will cost them much politically, economically and socially. In 
the worst scenario, for local private entrepreneurs it is much easier to utilize punishment 
to native political leaders rather than rotated ones, as their tenure normally is less than 
three years, on average, for local mayors. The ability of retaliation by local private 
75 
 
entrepreneurs creates stable conditions of property rights protection at the local level and 
hence influences private entrepreneurs’ investment decisions.  
Finally, local protectionism can be seen as a bad thing in the view of the central 
government or provincial government in terms of central coordination, policy 
compliances, and destructive local autonomy. It is true that this is the very reason behind 
the introduction of term limits and the rotation system by the central government. 
However, for indigenous private entrepreneurs, this is one source that helps to overcome 
the commitment problem and becomes an assurance of protection for their investment. 
In sum, for any local official, he/she cares about his/her own payoff that includes 
his/her wages and potential transfers from the local firms, money or favors. But those 
local officials who are native are more likely to protect private property rights since their 
political and economic interests are intertwined more closely with the private 
entrepreneurs. The credible threats of retaliation to potential predatory activities by local 
indigenous private entrepreneurs creates stable conditions of property rights protection at 
local level and hence encourages private investment and economic development.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, I argue that those local political leaders who are native 
are more likely to protect private property rights since the interests of local political 
actors and economic actors are intertwined closely. Native political leaders have less 
chance to be promoted and have more incentives to protect private investment in order to 
get political support as well as economic benefits. 
Players 
Before formalizing the symbiosis logic of secure property rights, I identify the 
players and their preferences as follows. There are three players in the local economy, 
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Government (G) is the principal, the local political official serves (S) as the supervisor 
and the Private entrepreneur (P) is the agent. In the context of China, I identify political 
actors as local political leaders, economic actors as indigenous private entrepreneurs, and 
government includes central and local.  
Preferences 
I make an extremely simple assumption that the goal of the government and 
political actors may not be the same. Government (G), both central and local, cares about 
tax revenue. The primary and foremost concern of local political leaders (S) is to stay in 
an office and being promoted to a higher rank. But the ultimate goal of local political 
leaders is to acquire more wealth and secure their possessions. In other words, the pursuit 
of political power is the means to achieve the end (wealth acquisition). For the 
indigenous private entrepreneur (P), what he/she wants is not only to maximize profit but 
also to secure their property rights. For the later goal, economic actors are willing to pay 
the costs (Cp) as long as they expect some positive level of profits in compensation.   
G cares about tax revenue (t).  
S cares about his own payoff, which includes his wages (w) and potential transfers 
from the Firms (Ts).  
P cares about maximizing its own profits (r) while minimizing costs (c).  
The second assumption I make is that indigenous private entrepreneurs do not 
necessarily demand efficient property rights. In fact, it is not clear that an individual 
private entrepreneur should always demand that the government protect everyone’s 
property rights. According to Haber et al. (2003), an indigenous private entrepreneur can 
receive utility from the secure and efficient property rights, because this makes her asset 
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more liquid, and therefore more valuable. However, if selective enforcement grants the 
indigenous private entrepreneur more comparative advantage in the market, then it may 
be more profitable to demand less than universal enforcement. Between these two 
possibilities, it is assumed that indigenous private entrepreneurs care first and foremost 
about their own property rights. Any profit-maximizing actor would readily accept the 
exclusive protection of her property rights, providing that it produced better benefits to 
that actor. 
Finally, it is assumed that there exist information asymmetries between the 
government, local political leaders, and economic actors. In other words, the activities of 
local political leaders and economic actors cannot be observed by the government, and 
indigenous private entrepreneurs cannot perfectly monitor the impact of the government’s 
actions or policies upon their property rights.  
The Costs of Secure Property Rights (Cp) 
Producer (P) chooses whether or not to invest with anticipated tax rate t ≥ 0, and 
expected revenue r > c >0，where r is the revenue, c the cost, and t the tax rate. To make 
an investment, P needs to get connected with S to protect its property. The costs of 
property rights are tolerated as long as P expects some positive level of profits in 
compensation (ep). This expected compensation can be a tax discount or special market 
access. To sum up,  
1. Producer (P) choose whether or not to invest with anticipated tax rate t ≥ 0; r 
> c > 0 
2. Government (G) sets tax rate t, 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 
3. Game ends with payoffs: 
G: t • r 
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S: w + Ts 
      
P: 
           0 if investment not made 
For any potential investment, P can choose to get connected with S to get 
protection for her investment or not to do so. The profit for not getting connected is r-tr-
c> 0 with the risk of being predated k. The profit for getting connected is r-tr-c-Cp+ep>0 
with property protection. Parameters r and tr are known to S and P but cannot be 
observed by G. To lower the risk of predation, P needs to get connected with S to get 
property protection. I assume that P cannot get connected with G for property protection. 
(In the real world, it is impossible to get connected with the central government and local 
government because under authoritarian rule it is almost impossible to access the 
government through formal institutions. In other words, it is much easier to access the 
government through political actors). This assumption can be relaxed by assuming that it 
is very costly to reach G for protection.  
To secure property rights, P and S can cooperate by signing a contract.* In 
cooperation, P pays S. However, they face some transaction costs to agree with this 
arrangement. I assume that S can get part of Ts = iCp where 0≤i≤1and (1-i) Cp, which 
indicates the transaction costs of symbiotic relationship.  
In this context, the wage of S is a constant w. When S failed in political struggles, 
she/he loses her/his wage w. The probability of being punished is mnp, where m denotes 
the failure probability in political struggle and n denotes the detection probability.  
                  (1 – t) r – c – Cp + ep if investment made 
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Investment Decision  
For any potential investment, P can choose whether or not to invest with an 
anticipated tax rate t ≥ 0. She can also choose to get connected with S to get protection 
for her investment.  
If she chooses not to get connected, her problem is as follows: 
         r-tr-c> 0 with the risk of being predated k.                                                 (1) 
If she chooses to get connected, her problems become as follows: 
        r-tr-c-Cp+ep > 0                                                                                           (2) 
subject to the participation constraint of S: 
                   Ts =iCp≥ mnpw                                                                                             (3) 
Thus,  
       ep-Cp≥
i
mnpw
                                                                                                  (4) 
In the current framework, a symbiotic relationship is more likely for higher i and 
thus the private investment growth rates are higher for higher i. This can be seen from 
equation (4), as the right-hand side is decreasing in i. This simple framework generates 
the main hypothesis regarding the symbiotic property protection and I will test with data 
as follows. 
Hypothesis: Symbiotic relationship between political and economic actors at the 
local level is more likely to happen when local political officials are native and 
hence the private investment growth rates are higher. 
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4.2 Research Design 
To assess the determinants of property rights protection, the general model tested  
is Private investment  
               = f Nativity  
   + 92Private 
   + 92Total 
   + Region 
   + Education 
   + Edu1 
   + Firstjob 
   + Partyschool 
   + Age 
   + Error term 
 
Dependent Variable  
Private investment is my dependent variable and an indicator of property rights 
protection. I use private investment in fixed assets as an indicator to measure the security 
of property rights. This is a good proxy for secure property rights because this kind of 
private investment requires significant immediate costs with only promises of future 
revenue. I also created a new variable coded as ratio-private, which calculates the 
proportion of private investment in fixed assets on total investment in fixed assets to 
gauge the level of private property rights protection in a locality. 
One common measure used to judge economic development and property rights is 
GDP growth rate and GDP per capita (Liu et al. 2012). GDP measurement may be a good 
way to measure the overall economic performance but is not a good indicator to measure 
the security of property rights. Scholars argue that China’s economic development largely 
relies on large-scale investment to facilitate high GDP growth rate. Investment can be 
categorized into two types, that concerning infrastructure and real estate properties, and 
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that in corporate development. The high GDP growth rate does not necessarily indicate 
the growth rate of private investment because this investment-led growth shows the large 
part of investment are government fund infrastructure projects and real estate properties 
rather than private investment. It may well be the case that the cities with higher 
economic growth rates had received more economic resources from higher authorities or 
borrowed money from state-owned banks to finance infrastructure projects.  
Despite the contribution of previous studies, the common problem in these 
empirical studies is the GDP measurement as an indicator of property rights protection. 
GDP growth rate or GDP per capita does not necessarily mean the development of 
private economy or the security of property rights for several reasons. First, before 1978, 
private economy was strictly forbidden. Anyone who did private business would be 
severely punished including being arrested and persecuted. The major contribution of 
GDP was from the state sector. Between 1978 and 1988, the private sector was not 
allowed officially except “individual entrepreneurs” (getihu) doing small business with 
less than eight employees. This is why other literature places more emphasis on the 
informal and coping strategies of the private entrepreneurs or local officials to get around 
the restrictions imposed by the unfavorable formal institutions, such as disguising their 
operations as collective enterprises or foreign firms in order to protect themselves (Tsai 
2007; Oi and Walder 1999; Sull 2005). The 1988 regulations allowed businesses with 
more than eight employees to be registered as “private enterprise” (siying qiye), but it 
was only after the introduction of the Company Law in 1993 that paved the way to the 
rapid development in private sector during the 1990’s. Therefore, any empirical study on 
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the development of private economy and property rights in China using GDP 
measurement does not distinguish these three time periods will distort the picture.  
Second, China is a mixed-market economy in which the state sector still plays an 
important role. For example, in 2010, the private investment in fixed assets made 13.7% 
of Guangdong province’s total investment in fixed assets. After including the investment 
of self-employed individuals, other limited liability and share holding firms, all four 
kinds of investment made 45.83% of total investment in fixed assets.21  
Finally, under the cadre rotation system and political officials’ relatively short 
tenure in one position before promotion or rotation (less than three years, on average, for 
local mayors), local officials are under enormous pressure to show their ability to produce 
economic growth quickly. One way of generating quick economic growth is to borrow 
money from banks to finance massive infrastructure projects. The typical way is by 
selling land or using land as collateral to borrow large sums of money from state-owned 
banks. The abusive land requisitions and forced evictions caused by local “land finance” 
have produced great grievances among rural peasants, urban dwellers, and small business 
owners. The worst example is the Chongqing model, where GDP growth rate is high and 
property rights violence prevalent. During Bo Xilai’s tenure, his administration borrowed 
the equivalent of more than 50% of local GDP to finance the construction projects. At the 
same period, many private entrepreneurs were imprisoned and billions in private 
properties were confiscated in the name of the campaign “signing red songs and 
crackdown black gangs” (Changhongdahei) (Pei 2012).  
                                                          
21 Guangdong Bureau of Statistics. Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 2011. Beijing: Statistical Press of China. 
83 
 
Because GDP measurement is not an accurate indicator to measure the 
development of private economy and the security of property rights, I use private 
investment in fixed assets as an indicator to measure the security of property rights. This 
is a good proxy for the security of property rights because this kind of investment 
requires significant risk with only promises of future revenue in an authoritarian regime. I 
collect a dataset on private investment in fixed assets from 1992 to 2008 in 21 prefecture-
level cities in Guangdong province. 
Explanatory Variable  
I explore the degree of symbiotic relationship between political and economic 
actors by examining the biographical information of the prefecture level political leaders 
in 21 municipality cities in Guangdong province. These local political leaders include 
111 mayors and 92 party secretaries. I trace the careers of all the 203 political leaders of 
21 municipalities between 1992 and 2008. I proxy the transaction costs of symbiotic 
relationship by whether the top leaders of prefecture-level cities are native and create one 
dummy variable nativity.  Nativity identifies whether a mayor or party secretary was born 
in Guangdong province, which takes a value of 1, otherwise its value is 0. Once a 
municipality had local political leaders who were born in Guangdong province, the 
chances were high that the leaders would have close ties to local economic actors and 
face more strict social constraints; therefore, they were more likely to protect property 
rights. In contrast, rotated local political leaders would have close ties to the higher 
authorities so that they would lack the incentives to protect the private property rights. 




Control Variables  
A host of control variables are also involved in my model. I include initial 
economic variables, geographical variables, and some socioeconomic variables. 
According to the literature, initial economic conditions will have positive effects on 
economic development (Solow 1956). In the model with the private investment in fixed 
assets from 1992 to 2008 as the dependent variable, I control private investment in fixed 
assets in 1992 and total investment in fixed assets in 1992.  
With respect to geographical variables, I create a dummy variable region (PRD=1, 
other=0) identifying whether a municipality belongs to Pearl River Delta (PRD) region, 
Eastern coast, Western coast, or Mountain area. This dummy variable is to control the 
location advantage of a municipality and the effects PRD on the economic growth of a 
municipality.  
I create five dummy variables in order to control socioeconomic factors that may 
have impacts on the dependent variable. One is education (education in Guangdong=1, 
otherwise=0). This variable is created to catch the phenomenon of those local leaders 
who were not born in Guangdong province but pursued their higher education in 
Guangdong. According to the literature of social connections, locality of origin, 
classmates, and job-related colleagues are common ways to establish social networks in 
China (Guo 2001; Luo 2007).  Therefore, those rotated political leaders who studies in 
Guangdong would have established close ties to local elites. I also created a dummy 
variable edu1 (college degree=1, otherwise=0) to control local political leaders’ 
education attainment as an indicator for individual human capital.  
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Likewise, the dummy variable (first job in Guangdong=1, otherwise=0) is to 
control job-related social networks. And party school experience (Yes=1, No=0) is to 
detect the common practice where local political leaders strive to establish new political 
connections with higher officials during their study in party schools since the party 
school is the best place to meet other political leaders. Finally, I created a dummy 
variable age to control local political leaders age effect on their behaviors. 
4.3 Data 
I collected a dataset on private investment growth rate, the prefecture-level of 
political leaders for 21 municipality cities in Guangdong province between 1992 and 
2008.  I focus on Guangdong province because Guangdong province is one of the most 
prosperous in China with the highest GDP among all the provinces, but the disparity 
within the province is larger than between provinces.  
There are 21 municipality cities in Guangdong province, 9 in PRD region, 4 in 
eastern coast, 3 in western coast, and 5 in mountain areas. A prefecture-level municipality 
is subject to the jurisdiction of a provincial government, and directly controls some urban 
districts while overseeing some counties or smaller cities on behalf of the provincial 
government.  
The data used in this paper comes from two primary sources: First, the data of 
private investment in fixed assets between 1992 and 2008 come from Guangdong 
Statistical Yearbook. It is worth noting that the data of the Yunfu municipality only 




Second, the data and CVs on 203 municipality’s leaders between 1992 and 2008 
come from government website of Guangdong province, People’s Daily online, and 
municipality newspapers. Information on two mayors and one party secretary are missing 
in this dataset. Table 4.1 presents a descriptive statistics of variables. 
As shown in Table 4.1, the average length in office of prefectural level officials is 
round 3 years. The average age is 51.5 years old, where the youngest local leader is at 38; 
and the oldest at 66. The average of private investment in fixed assets is around 14.63 
(1.463 billon RMB Yuan); the average of total investment in fixed assets is around 
206.55 (20.655 billon RMB Yuan). The average ratio private investment on total 
investment is 0.147, which means the average percentage of private investment on total 
investment is 14.7%. 
Table 4.1 Statistical Description of Variables 
 
     
Variables                          Obs         Mean        Std. Dev.                Min            Max 
Tenure 197   3.395939   1.891329 1 11 
Age 599 51.50918 4.919027 38 66 
Private investment 664 14.62557 11.11922 0.19 71.86 
Total investment 665 206.5487 312.5168 7.19 2101.45 
Nativity 657 0.8219178 0.3828734 0 1 
Region 666 0.4324324 0.4957859 0 1 
Education 413 0.748184 0.4345825 0 1 
Education 
attainment 590 0.5 0.5004243 0 1 
First job 532 0.862782 0.3444012 0 1 
Party school 519 0.5722543 0.4952291 0 1 
Ratio-private 663 0.1474508 0.1012198 0.0001476 0.4584749 
 
Source: Compiled by author. 




As a comparison, Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 present descriptive statistics on native 
local officials and rotated officials. The average length in office is very close for native 
mayors or the Party secretaries and rotated ones, around 3 years. The average age is also 
very close for native local political leaders and rotated ones, around 51 years old.  
The average of private investment in fixed assets between 1992 and 2008 is 15.13 
(1.513 billion RMB Yuan) for places where have native officials, but 12.70 (1.27 billion 
RMB Yuan) for rotated officials. The municipality cities with native political leaders 
have higher private investment than the cities with rotated leader about 20%. In contrast, 
the average of total investment in the cities with rotated leaders is 454.41 (45.441 billion 
RMB Yuan), but it is only 154.61 (15.461 billion RMB Yuan) with native leader, which 
is higher almost 3 times.  
Table 4.2 Statistical Description of Variables on Native Prefecture-level Political Leaders  
                                                                                               
                                               Obs       Mean          Std. Dev.             Min            Max 
 
Tenure           153   3.529412   1.970369               1              11 
Age 482 51.66805 4.974966 38 66 
Private investment 540 15.13476 11.31886 0.32 71.86 
Total investment 539 154.6141 211.6711 7.19 1687.11 
Nativity 540 1 0 1 1 
Region 540 0.3685185 0.4828503 0 1 
Education 306 0.8823529 0.3227175 0 1 
Education 
attainment 476 0.4390756 0.4967965 0 1 
First job 421 0.9714964 0.1666044 0 1 
Party school 405 0.6049383 0.4894686 0 1 
Ratio-private 539 0.1615698 0.1004819 0.004481 0.4584749 
                                                                                              
 
Source: Compiled by author. 





Table 4.3 Statistical Description of Variables on Rotated Prefecture-level Political 
Leaders  
                                                                                               
                                              Obs         Mean         Std. Dev.               Min           Max 
Tenure             39   3.076923   1.528408                1                6 
Age 117 50.8547 4.644732 40 60 
Private investment 115 12.6973 10.01239 0.19 68.39 
Total investment 117 454.41 524.4573 16.21 2101.45 
Nativity 117 0 0 0 0 
Region 117 0.7008547 0.459853 0 1 
Education 107 0.364486 0.4835506 0 1 
Education 
attainment 114 0.754386 0.4323511 0 1 
First job 111 0.4504505 0.4997952 0 1 
Party school 114 0.4561404 0.5002716 0 1 
Ratio-private 115 0.0841656 0.0808905 0.0001476 0.4017234 
 
Source: Compiled by author. 
Note: The unit for all financial variables is 100.000.000 RMB yuan. 
 
It is worth noting that the average proportion of private investment in fixed assets 
on total investment in cities with native political leaders is 16.16%, but in cities with 
rotated political leaders is only 8.4%. All these figures suggest that the prefectural cities 
with rotated political leaders have lower private investment but much higher total 
investment. 
4.4 Main Empirical Results  
The estimation results are presented in Table 4.4. I first estimate the correlation 
coefficients between the dependent variable and the independent variable.  In model 1, 
the dependent variable nativity has a positive (2.14) and significant (P<0.033) effect on 






Table 4.4 OLS Regression Results 
 
                              Dependent variable: Private investment         Ratio-private                                                                
                                                 Model 1              Model 2             Model 3 
Nativity 2.14* 3.33*** 3.97*** 



















(Guangdong=1, other=0) (0.301) (0.174) 
Education attainment 3.94*** 0.67 
















Constant 12.26 -0.16 5.25*** 
 
0.000 (0.874) (0.000) 
N 655 353 352 
R2 0.007 0.2184 0.4794 
F-value 4.57 10.65 35 
 
P-values are in parentheses. 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
 
In model 2, after controlling for the initial economic variables, geographical 
features, and socioeconomic factors, we can see that the correlation coefficient between 
private investment and nativity is positive (3.33) and highly significant (P<0.001), 
indicating that having a native political leader has positive effect on private investment in 
fixed assets. In other words, if a city has a native political leader, then this city has higher 
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private investment, suggesting private firms in this city enjoys better property rights 
protection.  
Among the control variables, the initial economic conditions have a significant 
effect on private investment. But what is interesting is that private investment in 1992 has 
a positive effect whereas total investment in 1992 has a negative effect on private 
investment. As for socioeconomic variables, the coefficient of education is insignificant; 
suggesting whether a local political leader studied in Guangdong did not affect private 
investment. However, the level of education attainment has a positive effect on private 
investment. Also, party school experience has a positive and significant effect on private 
investment. Those local political leaders who have higher education and those who have 
party school experience promote local private economy. The geographical variable has no 
significant effect, which indicates that whether a city is in PRD, east coast, west coast, or 
mountain areas is not important to private investment in Guangdong province.  
Overall, the regression results are very consistent to my theoretical prediction. 
Native local political leaders are more likely to protect private property rights and hence 
encourage local private economy. Since the native political leaders in the province had 
more close ties with local economic elites, they would have more incentives to promote 
the development of private economy.  
4.5 Robust Test 
I ran the third model, where the independent variable is ration-private, the 
proportion of private investment in fixed assets on total investment in fixed assets. The 
results are even more robust. The correlation coefficient between private investment and 
nativity is positive (3.97) and highly significant (P<0.000), indicating that having a native 
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political leader has strong positive effect on private investment. However, there are 
different results between the model 2 and the model 3 among the control variables. First, 
the level of education has a positive effect on private investment, but has no effect on the 
ratio private investment. Second, those leaders who had their first job in Guangdong have 
no effect on private investment, but have a negative effect on the ratio private investment. 
Third, party school experience has a positive and significant effect on private investment, 
but has no effect on ration private investment. Finally, local political leaders’ age has no 
effect on private investment, but has a slightly negative effect on ratio private investment. 
To see if the above results and inferences are robust, I ran two models. Comparing 
model 1 and model 2, we find that they are similar in terms of the effects of the 
independent variables and explanation power indicating that the relationship between 
property rights protection and nativity of local political leaders are stable and my 
specification are robust. I also conducted the third model, which examines the effects of 
nativity on the ratio private investment and the results are even more robust. All of the 
findings confirm the theoretical prediction that having native local political leaders 
increase private investment substantially. 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
My study tries to explore the micro-foundations of the credible commitment logic 
by formalizing symbiotic logic in property rights protection and provides some empirical 
evidence for it. I have shown that when there were no credible commitment to protect 
property rights, native local political leaders had incentives of supporting local private 
entrepreneurship for political, economic, and reputation building. Indigenous local 
private entrepreneurs were more likely to invest in the localities with native local political 
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leaders because in a small community with dense social connections they could monitor 
the potential predatory activities and provide credible threats of retaliation. The 
transaction costs in the symbiotic relationship between native local political leaders and 
indigenous private entrepreneurs are low, and therefore this relationship is more likely to 
happen. The interactions between political and economic actors created conditions 
similar to secure property rights, and hence encouraged the development of private 
economy. Though property rights protection afforded by this logic is unstable and 
localized, in places where secure and efficient property rights are missing, this 
mechanism has been effective in fostering local economic development. 
Two main challenges for this study are measurement and data quality. For the 
challenge of measurement, I used private investment as an indicator to measure the 
security of property rights. This is a better proxy than GDP measurement since this kind 
of investment bears considerable risks with only promises of future revenue whereas 
GDP growth may not require the commitment to protect private property rights, as long 
as the local leaders could gain economic resources for higher authorities or state-owned 
financial institutions.   
Data quality is a common concern to any study on contemporary China. I test the 
hypothesis of the model using various sources of data: biographies of local political 
leaders, statistical yearbooks, and the media reports. Empirical results I tested in this 
paper are consistent with the theoretical prediction. All the findings suggest having native 
local political leaders promoted a substantially higher level of private investment. While 
my study focuses on Guangdong province, the symbiotic logic can apply to other 




LOCAL INDUSTRY POLICYMAKING AS A SOURCE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
A Case Study of B&B Industry Policymaking in Xiamen 
This chapter provides a case study of local B&B industry policymaking that further 
support the second hypothesis generated from the model—the bargaining game between 
private investors and local officials, presented in Chapter 2. It shows how different types 
of local officials make very different local industry policy choices under the same 
incentive structure, and, therefore, create a condition that allows for property rights 
protection or expropriation.22 
A large body of literature has attributed China’s economic miracle to the direct 
consequences of fiscal and political institutions rather than economic institutions such as 
the property rights regime. Growth-driven activities pursued by local governments or 
local officials were directly shaped by incentive structures, such as fiscal arrangement 
and cadre performance evaluation system, designed by the central government. But the 
incentive structure itself cannot explain different behaviors of local governments, ranging 
from developmental, corporatists, entrepreneurial, and predatory, which led to variations 
in local economic performance. 
                                                          
22 The basic facts in this paper were collected from news reports, government reports, as well as interviews. It is 
noteworthy that interviews only serve as supplementary sources of information. The validity and reliability of 
constructed interviews may be questionable with its intervening nature, particular when informants consciously and 
unconsciously make sense of their research. The examination of media repots and government reports will help to 
restore an original scene that seeks to make intelligible reasons state agents give for their actions. My interviewees 
included officials, B&B business owners, chairmen of B&B associations, journalists, and scholars in Xiamen. To the 




Local industry policymaking has been treated as the local states’ or local officials’ 
rational response to a problem, a simple strategic action to faction power struggles, or 
muddling through bureaucratic politics decision-making. The role local officials play in 
the local industry policy initiatives and policymaking and its effects on property rights is 
not clear. Local officials may pursue very diverse industry policy choices in accordance 
with the conditions and constraints placed on them. As Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 have 
shown, personal characteristics of local officials under the same institutional setting as 
the Cadre Evaluation System (CES) create advantages and constraints, which influence 
local officials’ behaviors toward private property rights in order to achieve their career 
concerns and monetary interests.  
My theory argues that native local officials are more likely to respond to their local 
“support” constituency’s interests in local policy making than transferred/rotated 
officials,23 especially those who transferred from the central agencies. Whether or not 
local state becomes predatory or developmental depends on what types of key local 
officials and whether they are native or have been rotated/transferred from outside that 
locality. Compared with native local officials, the rotated/transferred local officials tend 
to be predatory to private property rights regardless of their orientations toward economic 
growth as a result of the cadre performance evaluation system. 
In addition to the empirical test in Chapter 4, this chapter further provides the 
support by examining the role of different types of local officials in local industry 
policymaking or initiative and policy changes. Taking policy changes of B&B industry in 
Xiamen as an example, this chapter shows that under the current institutional 
arrangements, local leaders possess a great deal of autonomy over local industry policy 
                                                          
23 The idea of “support” constituency comes from the “dual constituency” hypothesis (Fiorina 1974). 
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making thus allowing them to pursue their own preferences, and political and economic 
interests strategically in dealing with private sector. As a result, individual local officials 
rather than the governments (central or local) become a major source of uncertainty for 
private property rights in China even though the central government enacted the Property 
Rights Law in 2005. 
This chapter attempts to answer the following questions: Why and how the local 
industry policy on B&B business has been made? Why is there a dramatic change in local 
industry policy toward B&B business in Gulangyu? Why the change of local industry 
policy is possible? How was this policy change implemented? 
The case study constitutes four sections. The first section introduces the 
development of the B&B sector in Xiamen. The second section demonstrates policy 
change of B&B industry and shows that the problem of “doing business without license” 
and “fine and detention of B&B owners” are direct consequences of local industry policy 
changes. The third section presents how and why two contradictory local industry 
policies took place, the logics behind such changes, and their outcomes. The fourth 
concludes. 
5.1 The Development of the Bed & Breakfast Industry in Gulangyu, Xiamen 
The bed-and-breakfast (B&B) business has been increasing dramatically throughout 
the world. In China, the B&B industry emerged as a new phenomenon in the late 1990s 
with the development of domestic tourism. Like elsewhere, the nature of B&B business 
has resulted in a great variety of establishments, as well as what constitutes a B&B (Jones 
& Guan 2011). In the most cases, a B&B often refers to a homestay, or a “family hotel” 
(an English translation of the Chinese name 家庭旅馆) as it is often an owner-occupied 
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private home with a number of guest rooms. But increasingly, more and more Chinese 
B&B hostels are under the operation of private entrepreneurs who are not owners but 
entered the business through investing private capital. In either case, the B&B presents a 
great opportunity for the growth of entrepreneurship in China. In this study, I use the 
term B&B hostel that includes both owner-occupied “family hotels” and non-owner 
invested inns or lodges.   
B&B hostels in China are usually located around famous scenic spots or attractive 
tourism destinations, and achieved great success (Zheng & Li 2007; Lu 2007). In general, 
local government encouraged residents to operate B&B businesses to relieve the stress on 
tourist accommodation and to facilitate local economic development. But as the case of 
the Gulangyu B&B industry shows, local political leaders’ attitudes toward B&B industry 
are very different and hence affect their policy choices on the industry’s development and 
private investment. 
The hotel business has been categorized as a special sector in China. Theoretically 
speaking, anyone who wants to enter the hotel business should apply for a special permit 
after the facility meets several requirements set by different government agencies. The 
process of so-called “six licenses” of a B&B hostel takes at least six months to complete. 
As a result, most B&B owners started their investment for the business when they got the 
first permission from the local sub-district government. Table 5.1 shows the application 










A. Pre-permission from Gulangyu sub-district government 
B. Permission from GSMC (beginning in May 2010)  
1. License 1—Fire Certificate from Siming district Fire department 
2. License 2—Special Sector Permission from Siming district police station 
3. License 3—Industry and Commerce Business License from Siming district Administration of 
Industry and Commerce 
4. License 4—Tax Certificate  
5. License 5—Sanitary Certificate 
6. License 6—Environmental Protection Certificate 
 
Source: Cai Changchun, “Gualngyu Shengyi zhongde Minzi ‘Ermeng’” [Private 
Investment’s ‘Nightmare’ in Gulangyu’s World Heritage Application Process], 
Fazhizhoume [Rule by Law Weekend], 09-04-2013. 
Gulangyu is an island off the southwest coast of Xiamen city, which is an old port 
city in Fujian province in southern China and has been one of five Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs) since 1980. As a place of residence for Westerners during the China’s 
colonial past, it is famous for its colonial architecture and for hosting more than 600 
pianos, giving it the nickname of “Piano Island.” The island is on China’s top list of 
National Scenic Spots and is one of the most popular domestic tourist destinations. 
Administratively, it forms Gulangyu sub-district of Xiamen’s Siming district 
government. However, the island is also under the administrative guidance of Gulangyu-
Wanshi Scenic Management Committee (GSMC) that is directly controlled by Xiamen 
government. Table 5.2 shows this unique nature of administrative system. 
 
A B 1 2 3 4 5 6 
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Source of Table 5.2: “The brief introduction of Gulangyu-Wanshi Scenic Management 
Committee,” at 
http://www.gly.cn/zhfxxgk/zhfxxgkml/index.htm?u=/zhfxxgk/zhfxxgkml/gwhgk/index.ht




















GSMC enjoys equal power but shares different administrative responsibilities with 
Siming district government in the hierarchical government structure. This arrangement 
can be traced back to 2003 when Gulangyu was originally a district of Xiamen but 
dissolved and transferred its partial administrative power to Siming district. Under this 
dual administrative system, the GSMC is responsible for Gulangyu’s scenic regulation, 
preservation, construction and management while Gulangyu sub-district government is 
responsible for the residents of the island.24 
The so-called “duel administrative system” has been cited as a factor that affects the 
development of Guangyu B&B industry (Huang 2013). However, as this essay will show 
it is local political leaders’ personal policy choices, which determined the change of B&B 
industry policy, and hence affected the private property rights. 
Xiamen’s first private owned hostel emerged in the late 1980’s in Gulangyu. In 2006, 
the first B&B hostel started business when the former German counselor’s building was 
renovated and transformed into a B&B hostel. But it was only after the pass of the 
“Regulations on Gulangyu B&B Industry (Trial)” in 2008 that the industry began to 
develop rapidly. There were only six B&B hostels in 2008. As of 2013, privately owned 
B&B hostels have increased to almost four hundred. Figure 5.1 shows the number of 
B&B in Gulangyu between 2006 and 2013. 
However, of the 400 B&B hostels only 126 are fully licensed. Another 130 B&B 
hostels are at various stages of the six-licenses application process. The remaining 100 or 
so hostels are operating without any license. Although 130 hostels only have partial 
license they still pay all relevant taxes and fees, and received the “proof of temporary tax 
                                                          




payment” from relevant local governmental agencies. Figure 5.2 demonstrates the 
distribution of licensed B&B hostels in Gulangyu by 2013. 
Figure 5.1 The Number of Bed & Breakfast Hostels in Gulangyu from 2006 to 2013 
 
Source: Cai Changchun, “Gualngyu Shengyi zhongde Minzi ‘Ermeng’” [Private 
Investment’s ‘Nightmare’ in Gulangyu’s World Heritage Application Process], 
Fazhizhoume [Rule by Law Weekend], 09-04-2013, and Xu Yixin, “Gulangyu B&Bs 




5.2 The Change of Local Policy on Gulangyu B&B Industry 
With the rapid development of B&B industry in Gulangyu, the local government 
faced great challenges in managing the fast growing number of tourists and B&B hostels, 
particularly in regulating the market, and providing public goods. In response to these 
challenges, local government added extra procedures as a way of managing the B&B 
industry in Gulangyu in May 2010. In other words, any one who wants to start a B&B 
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Figure 5.2 The Distribution of Licensed B&B Hostels in Gulangyu by 2013 
 
Source: Cai Changchun, “Gualngyu Shengyi zhongde Minzi ‘Ermeng’” [Private 
Investment’s ‘Nightmare’ in Gulangyu’s World Heritage Application Process], 
Fazhizhoume [Rule by Law Weekend], 09-04-2013, and Xu Yixin, “Gulangyu B&Bs 
(in Chinese).” The Summit Forum for the Development of B&Bs Across the Strait, 
September, 2014. 
 
The problem of “doing business without a license” in the B&B sector in Gulangyu is 
a direct consequence of local government’s decision to stop processing all B&B 
applications, no matter at what stage a B&B hostel was in the process of the six-license 
application, as well as their decision to stop accepting new applications in late 2011. In 
the first half of 2012, the application process was restarted but it was closed again in July 
2012. Because of the long process of the six-licenses application, no single B&B hostel 
was able to complete its application during this period resulting in 130 B&B hostels at 
various stages of the application process. Since then, another 100 B&B hostels were 
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In May of 2013, the GSMC issued “Gulangyu Applying for World Cultural Heritage 
Improvement Projects—A Specific Plan for Gulangyu B&B Industry” (the Plan), which 
aims to regulate the confusions about the development of the B&B industry in Gulangyu. 
The plan was drafted by the joint work of GSMC and Siming district government, and 
ratified by the Planning Department of Xiamen. As the date of the promulgation, all 
applications and clearance of B&B hostels in Gulangyu should follow the guidance of the 
Plan. According to the Plan, almost half of all B&B hostels in Gulangyu will be closed 
down, which means nearly 10 to 20 million private investment will be under threat. The 
Plan also provides practical guidance to the procedure of shutting down a B&B business. 
In order to meet the cut-off numbers, the Plan urges regulatory and law enforcement 
agencies to work hard in checking and closing down those B&B hostels who are “doing 
business without a license”. Beginning in late 2013, many owners of B&B hostels with 
partial licenses were fined and detained by local police station for 5 to 15 days.25  
The above description of the development of the B&B industry in Gulangyu shows 
very clearly that the problem of “doing business without a license” in the B&B sector in 
Gulangyu and “fine and detention of B&B owners” in Xiamen are direct consequences of 
the administrative decision in 2011 and local government agencies’ orders in 2013. But 
there is no doubt that the development of the Gulangyu B&B industry was a result of 
local government’s industry policy introduced in 2008.  
In the next section, I will show how the local industry policy of B&B sector becomes 
a source of private property rights protection. A dramatic change in local industry policy 
toward B&B business in Gulangyu turned out to be a way of private property rights 
                                                          
25 Han Yuting “Gulangyu Applies for World Cultural Heritage: Encouraging Private Investment Turned Out Fine and 
Detention” Jinjing Guancha Bao [Economic Review Daily] (Beijing) 09-27-2014. 
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expropriation. The comparison of two local political leaders’ characteristics and career 
pattern demonstrates how the change of local industry policy is possible and how this 
policy change was implemented, as well as why that dramatic policy change toward the 
Gulangyu B&B industry has been made. 
5.3 Local Industry Policymaking as a Source of Property Rights Protection or  
      Expropriation 
 
The origin of the B&B sector development in Gulanyu can be traced back to then the 
“first hand” (number one position) political leader of Xiamen, the Party secretary He 
Lifeng. Theoretically speaking, government leaders such as governors or mayors are 
responsible to economic affairs. In practice, the Party secretary has the final say over 
everything, including policies and personnel placement. This is because the Party and 
state hierarchies are intertwined in China. In the Chinese political structure, wherever 
there is a governor or mayor, there is a corresponding Party secretary, except at lower 
levels where the Party secretary and the executive are sometimes the same person. The 
Party secretary is usually the number one boss in the jurisdiction due to the working 
structure of the Party Committee. For example, at the city level, the Party secretary leads 
the city Party Committee, which consists of the mayor and vice mayors, as well as other 
officials heading important departments in the Party. The Party Committee members have 
a clear division of labor, where every member is responsible for certain affairs in the city. 
But the Party Committee determines all the major issues in the city, and inside the 
committee the Party secretary has the final say over everything, including policies and 




The Policymaking of the Gulangyu B&B Industry in Xiamen 
As I will show in this section, the Party secretary of Xiamen, He Lifeng played a 
decisive role in policy initiative and policy making of the B&B industry in Gulangyu and 
deserves special notice. Born in 1955 in Xingning, Guangdong province, He went to 
neighboring Fujian province as a zhiqing (sent down urban youth) when he was eighteen. 
In 1978, He became a college student studying fiscal finance at the department of 
economics in Xiamen University. During the school year, He joined the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) in 1981 and continued his study in graduate school in same 
discipline. In 1984, He got a master degree and started to work in the Xiamen Special 
Economic Zone’s economic institute. After several years working in Xiamen government 
agencies, He was appointed as Xiamen Xinglin district Party Secretary (first hand) in 
1990. Two years later, He was promoted to be Xiamen’s vice mayor and stayed in that 
position for three years. Theoretically speaking, He Lifeng was not a local native official 
since he was born in the neighboring province and grew up in Guangdong province. 
However, He lived in Xiamen for twenty years since he was 18 years old. He completed 
his education and got his first job in Xiamen. In practice, He is considered as a Xiamen 
local native official. In 1995, He Lifeng was rotated to Xiamen’s neighboring city, 
Quanzhuo, as vice-Party secretary and the acting mayor. Following the usual rule, He 
turned to be the mayor the following year. Two years later, He Lifeng was promoted to 
the first hand (the Party secretary) of Quanzhuo city. After another three years as the 
rotated top official in the province’s capital city at the same rank, He was transferred 
back to Xiamen as the first hand (the Party secretary) native political leader.  
105 
 
Policy making in China often is a product of a combination of rationality, power 
struggles, and bureaucratic politics.26 Even being a top leader in Xiamen city, to promote 
a local industry policy initiative such as B&B industry development still needs a skill for 
politics in the Chinese political structure to get things done. Early in 2006, the second 
year of Party Secretary He’s tenure in Xiamen as the top local leader, he gave a talk at a 
tourist industry development conference, encouraging local government to “promote fast 
development of the emerging B&B industry”.27 As a result, the former German counselor 
building was renovated and transformed into the first B&B hostel business in Gulangyu 
at the end of that year. But nothing has really happened since then. In the following 
year’s spring festival, He offered a night tour in Gulangyu to foreign friends (investors) 
and found out that contrary to his thoughts very few tourists stayed on the island at night 
because there were no commercial activities or nightlife. Next day, He sent a note to the 
GSMC indicating that the GSMC should take “some real actions” to promote the 
development of the B&B industry in Gulangyu.28 
Although He Lifeng made very clear both in public and private about his ambitions 
for the B&B industry development in Gulangyu, B&B development was slow until 2008, 
the third year of He’s tenure as a top leader in Xiamen. In May 2008, He made a visiting 
tour investigating the development of tourism in Gulangyu and figured out there were 
only 12 B&B hostels established in past two years since his first talk. To express his 
dissatisfaction about the development of the B&B sector in Gulangyu, He made a 
statement that set a clear goal of achieving 3000 B&B beds in Gulangyu by the end of 
                                                          
26 Policy making in China often attributes to two factors: rationality and faction power struggle. Lieberthal and 
Oksenberg (1988) introduced the bureaucratic politics in formulating policy.  
27 Shao Fangqing. “Apply for World Cultural Heritage! Save Gulangyu?” Diyi Caijing [The First Finance and 




2008. At the same time, He called a “major project work leading group” meeting in order 
to mobilize his colleagues to promote the B&B sector development.29 In November 2008, 
the city Party Committee held a special meeting discussing the development of the B&B 
industry in Gulangyu. In that meeting, the city Party committee discussed “Xiamen 
Gulangyu B&B Management Regulations (Trial)”, which was drafted by Siming district 
government. The meeting memo, as a local official document, shows that “Siming district 
government, the GSMC and other relevant government agencies should work together, 
make initiative moves and take proactive action, incorporating the application of World 
Cultural Heritage project, which would support and encourage the development of the 
B&B industry in Gulangyu.”30  
In December 2008, the Regulations became a formal local industry policy as Siming 
district government issued “Xiamen Gulangyu B&B Management Regulations (Trial)” 
publicly. At the same time, the Xiamen city Party committee and the Xiamen government 
forwarded the Regulations to different government agencies as well as made a statement 
indicating that ““Xiamen Gulangyu B&B Industry Management Regulations (Trial)”, 
which as drafted by Siming district government had been discussed and ratified by the 
city “major project work leading group” in the 46 meetings, now forwarded to your 
department, please make the effort to follow and enforce the regulations.”31 Since the 
promulgation of the Regulations, B&B hostels have increased dramatically during 2009 
and 2010 and reached 152 B&B hostels in Gulangyu with the total private investment 3 
to 4 hundred million. By the end of 2013, more than ten million tourists visited Gulangyu 
                                                          
29 Leading group has been used as an instrument to bridge top leaders and different sub-ordinate agencies that 
implement policies. In practice, leading group is outside the view of public but possesses a considerable weight of 
power in the Chinese politics (Lieberthal 2004). 
30 Cai Changchun, “Gualngyu Shengyi zhongde Minzi ‘Ermeng’” [Private Investment’s ‘Nightmare’ in Gulangyu’s 




Island and the total number of B&B hostels reached 300 including those without 
licenses.32 
The Policy Changes of the B&B Industry in Gulangyu 
The development of the B&B sector turned in another direction beginning in the late 
2009 as He Lifeng was transferred to Tianjin as a vice Party secretary and the succeeding 
top leader Yu Weiguo was in charge. Table 5.3 illustrates the policymaking and policy 
change process directed by two types of local political leaders. It is logical that as the 
industry developed rapidly government authority would shift its focus from the 
development policy to the regulation policy. However, the case of Gulangyu B&B shows 
that local officials’ policy choices with regards to the development of a sector are 
determined by individual leaders’ career concerns and their calculations which are 
conditioned by their resources and constraints. 
Like He Lifeng, Yu Weiguo was born in 1955. But his hometown is in Shandong 
province, eastern China. Similar to He Lifeng, Yu went to a neighboring province when 
he was eighteen, but became a worker in a chemistry factory in Taicang, Jiangsu 
province. Yu joined the CCP in 1975 and went to China People’s University in Beijing in 
1979 studying Chinese literature. In 1983, Yu started to work in a research department at 
the CCP’s Central Committee Secretariat’s Office. After several years of research work, 
Yu was appointed to a mishu (personal secretary) of Ding Guangen—the former Head of 
the CCP’s Central Department of Propaganda in 1991. Four years later, at the age of 
forty, Yu was a guazhi (temporary transferred duty)33 cadre to the Xiamen government as 
                                                          
32 GSMC 2013 annual work reports. 
33 Gazhi means higher organization delegates a cadre to lower one and serve in a lower level unit for a period while 
retaining one's position in the previous unit. It is argued as one of method to attain faster promotion in the Chinese 
political hierarchy (Kou and Tsai 2014).   
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the assistant mayor, and two years later was transferred formally to the Xiamen 
government. He became vice mayor of Xiamen in 1999, and then minister of the 
Department of Organization (DOO) of Xiamen in 2001 before becoming vice-Party 
secretary of the city in 2002. In 2005, Yu was promoted to deputy vice-minister of DOO 
of Fujian, and minister of DOO of Fujian the following year. In June 2009, Yu became 
the Party secretary of Xiamen.  
It is not clear if there was a faction power struggle between He Lifeng and Yu 
Weiguo. What public records show is that Yu Weiguo and He Lifeng shared no 
overlapping working experiences. When Yu came to Xiamen from Beijing, He Lifeng 
was transferred to a neighboring city as a rotated top political leader. While He Lifeng 
was transferred back to Xiamen, Yu had been promoted to the head of provincial DOO. 
The only overlapping period of theses two top leaders was two and half years when they 
were both provincial Party Standing Committee members between 2006 and 2009. 
Tirole (1994, p. 7) introduced the theory of career concerns that argues that civil 
servants and politicians “are concerned by the effect of their current performance not so 
much on their monetary reward, but rather on their reputation or image in view of future 
promotion.” Performance measurement for local officials in China comes form the Cadre 
Evaluation System (CES), which is the major instrument that the central government has 
used to manage its cadre corps. Economic growth measured by numbers of GDP growth 
rate has been one of major criteria to determine whether a particular local leader should 
be promoted to a higher rank (Li and Zhuo 2005). Another two important factors that 
determine local officials’ prospect of promotion are personal characteristics mainly age 
and education, and personal connections with their superiors in charge of promotion.  
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Table 5.3 The Policy Making and Policy Changes of Gulangyu B&B Industry in Xiamen 
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He Lifeng administration (2005.05—2009.05) 
1) Talk in a tourism industry development conference in April 2006 
2) A note to GSMC indicating that GSMC should take “some real actions” to promote the development of B&B 
industry in Gulangyu in February 2007. 
3) A visiting tour, a statement that sets a clear goal of achieving 3000 B&B beds in Gulangyu by the end of 2008, and a 
“major project work leading group” meeting in May 2008. 
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4) A special meeting of the city Party Committee discussing the development of B&B industry in Gulangyu in 
November 2008. 
5) The promulgation of “Xiamen Gulangyu B&B Management Regulations (Trial)” in December 2008. 
Yu Weiguo administration (2009.06—2013.05) 
1.Permission from GSMC in addition to “six-license” process of B&B hostel in May 2010. 
2-1.CPC standing committee’s enquiry on “improve Gulangyu’s tourism environment” 
2-2.Established “Gulangyu Scenic Improvement Work Leading Group” charged by GSMC 
3.Established “Gulangyu Applying World Cultural Heritage Work Leading Group” and the former Mayor was in 
charge of the group. 
4. An informal administrative order that temporarily suspended the application of B&B hostel in Gulangyu issued by 
GSMC 
5. Open the application 
6.  Re-closed the process 
7.  Re-opened the process 
8.  An informal administrative order using the form of a meeting memo signed by several government agencies issued 
to terminate the application 
9.  “Gulangyu Applying for World Cultural Heritage Improvement Projects—A Specific Plan for Gulangyu B&B 
Industry” issued by GSMC 
Source: Compiled by author. 
Unlike He Lifeng, Yu was a typical mishu cadre34 sent-down from the central 
organization of the CCP who lacked local government experiences. Although he worked 
in Xiamen for ten years, Yu was truly a transferred official. More importantly, compared 
to native leader He Lifeng, Yu had personal tie with higher rank officials both at the 
center and provincial DOO who were in charge of promotion. While He Lifeng had to 
respond to “support” constituency’s interests in order to secure his position, Yu just 
needed to build up an impressive image in the view of party officials for future 
promotion. By “support” constituency, it doesn’t mean specific constituencies within the 
electorate. Rather, it means the social and commercial elite, not the political elite. In the 
context of China, this means urban district level officials or local businesspersons. 
Due to the term limits and rotation system, Yu faced short-time pressure to show his 
ability for local governance in only 2 to 3 years so as to impress both his superiors and 
the local public to win promotion. One of the best strategies for him to demonstrate his 
                                                          
34 “Mishu cluster” is an important faction in the power struggle of Chinese politics. It refers to as Graeme Smith argues 
that “working as a sent-down cadre enhances their prospects of promotion” (Smith 2010).   
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ability was to pursue “achievement projects” for an instant success.35 In addition, as the 
succeeding transferred top leader, Yu needed to differentiate himself from the previous 
native Party secretary through his unique “achievement projects.” Yu concentrated his 
efforts on building the new city image—to make Gulanyu one of the World Cultural 
Heritages.36  
The dual administrative system of Gulangyu offered an opportunity for the new 
leader to introduce his “achievement project” and to intervene in the affairs of an ever-
growing local tourism industry. In May 2010, the second year of Yu’s tenure, the process 
of the six-license application of a B&B hostel added one more step—the permission from 
GSMC. Since GSMC is a subordinate agency of Xiamen government and the Party 
committee determines major affairs of the city, the Party secretary Yu gained final say 
over the direction of Gulangyu tourism industry development, specifically B&B 
development.  
In January 2010, Yu acquired another top position in the City People’s Congress 
(CPC) standing committee in addition to the Party secretary position, which is not normal 
practice in local political structure. Yu chose to show his local governance innovation by 
introducing the CPC standing committee’s enquiry on local government with regards to 
specific topics. The first enquiry of Xiamen’s history was held on November 29, 2010 
and the topic was about how to “improve Gulangyu’s tourism environment.” In order to 
follow up the issues raised in the enquiry, Xiamen government delegated to GSMC who 
                                                          
35 Short-time horizon in each locality causes short-term behavior of local officials eager for instant success. This is why 
many local officials are fanatic in “achievement projects” to demonstrate their ability to impress their superiors and the 
public. Achievement projects mainly refer to constructing fancy skyscraper, new airports, or city image with the money 
squeezed from public goods spending. 
36 Heritage tourism as a new way to promote local economy discussed by scholars, see Qin et. alt 2011.  
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coordinated with nine relevant government agencies to establish the “Gulangyu Scenic 
Improvement Work Leading Group.”37  
In December 2010, Xiamen government held the 119th executive meeting and 
decided to establish “Gulangyu Applying World Cultural Heritage Work Leading 
Group”, and the former Mayor was in charge of the group. The GSMC was responsible 
for the daily work of the applications and for coordinating government agencies in order 
to submit the application in 2013. Shortly after the establishment of the leading group, the 
GSMC issued an informal administrative order that temporarily suspended the 
application of B&B hostels in Gulangyu in the name of improving Gulangyu’s tourism 
environment and World Cultural Heritage application. Without knowing the reasons, the 
suspension of applications was lifted in July 2011 after a few months of rejection. But the 
suspension began again in November. Two or three months later, the suspension was 
lifted again and finally in July 2012, an informal administrative order in the form of a 
meeting memo signed by several government agencies was issued to terminate all the 
application to this point. This revolving door of local administrative orders resulted in 
almost 200 B&B hostels with a partial license or without any license doing business.  
In May 2013, the GSMC issued “Gulangyu Applying for World Cultural Heritage 
Improvement Projects—A Specific Plan for Gulangyu B&B Industry” (the Plan),” which 
aims to shut down at least half the number of B&B hostels on the island. The 
promulgation of the Plan as the turning point of policy making about the B&B industry in 
Gulangyu seriously threatens the property rights of private investors. In late 2013, many 
B&B hostel owners were detained for 5 to 15 days by Siming district police station and 
                                                          
37 Jiang Shengyang and Feng Shijie “To Make Effective Supervision: on Xiamen City People’s Congress Standing 
Committee Three Topic Enquiries.” China Daily 04-13-2011.   
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fined severely by different local government agencies. One month before the 
promulgation of the Plan, Yu gave a talk to the GSMC, which praised the achievement of 
GSMC on the job of Gulangyu improvement and encouraged them to work harder in 
order to “better protect and governance Gulangyu.”38  
5.4 Conclusion 
Local officials’ role in local industry policymaking is not a rational response to the 
problem; it is not simply strategic actions in response to faction power struggles; and it is 
not muddling through decision-making in bureaucratic politics. Performance evaluation 
systems associated with the prospect of promotion have motivated local political leaders 
to pursue policy initiatives. However, different types of local political leaders conditioned 
to resources and constraints determine the policy choices that local officials can make in 
order to satisfy goals. While native leaders with fewer resources and greater constraints 
are more likely to respond to “support” constituency’s interests, rotated officials, 
especially transferred officials from the center, are more likely to build impressive 
images or short-term “achievement projects” at the price of local public good. 
Local political officials formulate sometimes contradictory or conflicting local 
economic policies, although not just because of bureaucratic politics decision-making. 
Instead, these conflicting economic policies come from strategic calculations according 
to each local leader’s attributes and resources. In the case of Gulangyu B&B industry 
policy making in Xiamen, the policy changes of the B&B industry have not served to 
regulate the market but to promote local leader’s achievement project, which has created 
room for predatory activities on local private property rights. The same local state being 
                                                          
38 “The Party secretary Yu Weiguo’s important note to Gulangyu Management Committee’s work on April 4th, 2013”  
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developmental or predatory was a result of the change from native to transferred key 
local political leader. Understanding the variations of property rights, therefore, requires a 






This research hopes to contribute some new perspective to current studies on property 
rights in China. A lot of existing literature has systematically studied the causes of 
economic growth. This study takes a different approach, which, instead of directly 
looking for the causes of economic growth, tries to answer why private investors invest in 
the face of the commitment problem and why some local officials actively protected 
property rights more than others. To answer these questions, I provide a game-theoretic 
model to study the political economy of property rights in China, that is, a bargaining 
game between a firm and a local political official. This political-economics explanation 
sheds light on the variation in the protection of private property rights for private firms 
across China rather than regional variations of economic performance. 
6.1 The Summary of the Study 
In this study, I argue that property rights protection results from a bargaining 
game between a local political actor and a private investor under the incentive structure 
of the Cadre Evaluation System (CES) designed by the central government. As the 
personnel control system literature shows, official promotion is mainly determined by 
officials’ political and economic performance in local jurisdiction, their age, and degree 
of education, and informal personal connections with their superiors. As the competition 
has been getting more severe, the evaluation criteria, such as performance, age and 
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education degree, have been set higher and higher. Several criteria of local economic 
performance are actually out of control of the local political leaders. Young and well-
educated local officials are more preferred for further promotion. In addition, age limits 
to retirement and the rotation system shortened many officials’ political career. These 
factors make local officials’ promotion harder.  
At the same time, compared to political actors in democratic regime, there are two 
more distinct features of career patterns for political actors within the Chinese power 
hierarchy: 1) almost permanent tenure as long as they have secured an office; 2) almost 
no job option outside the political career when you are in the system. All of the 
aforementioned constraints place more weight on local political actors’ calculation with 
regards to their strategies to achieve their goals in terms of property rights protection. 
Under the current institutional arrangements, private firms are on their own to resist 
local officials’ predatory activities. However, resources and constraints as results of 
firms’ characteristics have impact on private firms’ post-bargaining power in the 
bargaining relationship with local officials. Only certain firm-specific characteristics can 
greatly enhance private investors’ bargaining power, which makes private firms in better 
position to protect their investment.  
There are three players in the local economy, Government is the principal, the local 
political official serves as the supervisor, and the Private entrepreneur is the agent. In the 
context of China, political actors are local political leaders, economic actors are 
indigenous private entrepreneurs, and government includes central and local. I detach 
political actors from government because the goals of government are not always 
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identical with political actors and hence I reconsider the role of local political leaders on 
economic development in general and property rights protection in particular. 
The goal of government both central and local is tax revenue. The primary and 
foremost concern of local political leaders is to stay in office and being promoted to a 
higher rank. But the ultimate goal of local officials is to acquire more wealth and secure 
their possessions. In other words, the pursuit of political power is the means to achieve 
the end (wealth acquisition). For the indigenous private entrepreneur, what he/she wants 
is not only to maximize profit but also to secure their property rights. 
As the discussion of the CES shows in chapter 2, local political actors face 
political imperatives and policy tasks set from upper-level governments. These tasks 
include promoting economic and fiscal revenue growth, boosting local employment, and 
providing public goods and services. Local officials are evaluated based on how well they 
accomplish these policy tasks. But they are constrained by the lack of fiscal resources as 
a result of the fiscal reform in early 1990s (Tao and Yang 2008; Yang 2006). Therefore, 
local officials turned their hands toward the private sector. The model assumes that local 
officials are potential predators and private firms are their prey. The predator and prey 
interact strategically in the context in which the central government evaluates the local 
officials on the basis of the cadre performance evaluation system. 
I model the relationship as a bargaining game with conflicting goals. Under the 
incentive structure of the CES, a firm has strong bargaining power at the time of entry 
because local officials are eager to attract investment and understand that the firm has 
other options. However, once the firm has made sector-specific investment, its bargaining 
power diminishes. Only certain firm-specific characteristics can empower private 
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investors’ bargaining power, which constrains local officials’ predatory behaviors 
towards private investment. In this way, firms with strong post-entry bargaining power 
enjoy a high level of credible commitment from the local government as local officials 
are under the pressures of performance-based evaluation by his/her superiors. But weak 
firms are vulnerable to the local officials’ predatory activities, and therefore need to rely 
on their social networks or bribery to overcome the commitment problem. In particular, 
all else being equal, the availability of an exit option greatly enhances the private firms’ 
post-entry bargaining power vis-à-vis local political actors. This hypothesis has been 
tested statistically in Chapter 3. Also, in Chapter 3, the media reports on government-
related property rights expropriation cases, further supporting the hypotheses. 
Another equilibrium that emerges from the interaction between local political 
supervisors and economic agents is the symbiotic relationship between less favorable 
local political officials and private entrepreneurs, which creates conditions similar to the 
secure property rights at the local level. Individual local official will calculate their 
resources and weakness in order to make their choices under the CES. If they are near 
age limits to retirement or less educated, and above all, have no personal tie with their 
superiors, they will have nearly zero chance to be promoted to a higher rank in the 
bureaucratic hierarchy and thus tend to pursue economic interests rather than political. 
More importantly, these local officials who are relatively disadvantageous in the power 
structure realize that their political survival needs support of local economic actors, and 
actively cultivate ties with them. They provide property rights at a local level as returns 
for political-economic alliance. This symbiotic relationship between less favorable local 
political actors and private entrepreneurs provides a condition similar to property rights, 
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which fostered the private sector and paved the way for long-term economic growth in 
certain localities. 
I argue that under the current institutions of CES and the cadre rotation system, 
the attributes of local political leaders affect their behaviors with regards to private 
investment. Local political leaders tend to protect private property rights when a 
symbiotic relationship between local officials and private entrepreneurs is feasible. All 
else being equal, native local political leaders have lower transaction costs, face more 
social constraints, and gain extra benefits in establishing symbiotic relationship with local 
private entrepreneurs and, therefore tend to protect private property rights more than 
those rotated ones. Chapter 4 provides systematic empirical evidence from Guangdong 
province both cross-sectionally and over time to tests this hypothesis by investigating the 
characteristics of 263 prefecture-level local political leaders between 1992 and 2008, and 
find that native political leaders promoted substantially higher levels of private 
investment—the proxy for the protection of private property rights. The results are robust 
to various alternative specifications, including models that account for heterogeneous 
regional characteristics, initial economic conditions, and socioeconomic factors. Chapter 
5 further provides a detailed case study on local industry policymaking in Xiamen, which 
also supports this hypothesis. 
To be true, the protection of property rights afforded by this relationship is 
fleeting and localized, but in a country where credible property rights institutions are 
weak, this mechanism has been effective in fostering the private sector in some localities 
at some times. More importantly, this study fills a void in the literature of political 
economy under authoritarian governments. It points to the unique authoritarian political 
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arrangement in China, where the central government is growth-oriented, and local 
officials enjoy a great deal of discretionary power. The model demonstrates that the 
protection of private property rights is not exogenously imposed by the central 
government but derives from the interactions between local officials and private firms. 
6.2 Prospects of Further Research 
Two main challenges for the empirical studies in this research are measurement 
and data quality. For the challenge of measurement, I have used private investment in 
fixed assets as an indicator to measure the security of property rights. This is a better 
proxy than GDP measurement since this kind of investment bears considerable risks with 
only promises of future revenue whereas GDP growth may not require the commitment 
to protect private property rights as long as the local leaders could gain economic 
resources for higher authorities or state-owned financial institutions. I also used the 
proportion of private investment on total investment as another way to measure the level 
of property rights protection. 
For property rights expropriations, I used arbitrary fess and fines collected by 
local government as an indicator to measure the level of indirect taking of property rights 
since these activities are common practices by local officials with regards to private 
firms. I also used media reports on government-related outright taking property rights 
cases to measure the level of property rights protection. 
Data quality is a common concern to any study on contemporary China. I tested 
the hypothesis of the model using various sources of data: biographies of local political 
leaders, statistical yearbooks, media reports, government reports, interview notes, and 
other fieldwork notes. Empirical results I tested in this research are consistent with the 
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theoretical prediction. All the findings suggest firms with high level of FSAs enjoy better 
property rights protection and having native local political leaders promoted substantially 
higher levels of private investment-the proxy of property rights protection.  
As for testing the local political leaders’ hypothesis, while my evidence focuses 
on Guangdong province, the symbiotic logic can apply to other provinces as well. Further 
study can be conducted by using a nationwide private investment dataset to test this 
hypothesis. 
Based on this research, it is worthy to explore the repeated game between local 
political actors and private investors. For one-short game, local political actors and 
private investors found themselves in a prisoners’ dilemma game. However, in an 
infinitely repeated version of the game, both players may choose to play, for example, a 
trigger strategy and therefore the “common interest” may be realized. The study also can 
explore the conditions under which both the local political actor and the private 
entrepreneur will cooperate with each other. 
Moreover, there is a need, both intellectual and practical, to further explore the 
sources that affect these political-economic dynamics and how these interactions at the 
micro-level lead to institutional change at the macro-level. One of the sources that may 
affect local political-economic dynamics is the impact of varying forms of formal and 
informal institutions in fostering collective bargaining. In the project involving business 
associations, I have tries to explore the effects of business associations on the bargaining 
relationship between private firms and local officials. Contrary to the existing studies, 
which generally consider business associations as state corporatist instruments, my in-
depth comparative case study shows the structure of business associations and the type of 
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association leaders in the bargaining game with local political leaders determining the 
effectiveness of the organization in terms of defending members’ interests and providing 
public goods such as property rights protection. 
Another source that may also affect local political-economic dynamics is in the 
form of corruption. Corruption is often treated as detrimental to economic development 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1993). Yet, some argue for efficiency-enhancing corruption, the 
effects of which may be positive (Leff 1964; Huntington 1968; Li and Wu 2010). Other 
studies further distinguish among different types of corruption (Shleifer and Vishny 
1993; Sun 2004; Wedeman 1997; Manion 2012). Many studies focus on the coexistence 
of rapid growth and rising corruption in China (Li and Wu 2010; Wademan 2012). The 
further study will explore how corruption, in the form of the mutually beneficial 
exchange between the local official and the private investor, becomes a source of 
property rights protection, and sees how it works in the local political-economic 
dynamics in China. 
Finally, further research projects can go in a different direction that will focus on 
the interplay between political institutions and political connections to explain the huge 
regional disparities in China’s rapid economic development. It will examine empirically 
how the interplay of promotion incentives and political connections of local political 
leaders affect investment patterns. 
In this research project, it will demonstrate that the huge regional disparities in 
economic growth and investment variations can partly be explained by the interplay of 
promotion incentives and political connections of local political leaders. Guided by a 
simple career concerns model with option of with and without political connections, it 
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will show that strategic actions and purposeful choices by local political leaders are key 
to understanding the regional disparities in economic growth and investment patterns. 
The logic is that local political leaders seek investment when they have strong incentives 
to promote growth, as economic growth is one major measure to judge their job 
performance and their job performance will influence their promotion results. However, 
political connection networks will determine what kind of investment local political 
leaders are looking for. Those who have political connections with the higher authorities 
will have an advantage for attracting the allocation of government support such as huge 
government projects, whereas those who do not have connections tend to promote local 
private sector in their jurisdictions. As a result, the regions with connected political 
leaders have relatively higher growth rate but lower level of private entrepreneurship 
activities.  
Using political connections as explanatory variable, it will explore the 
characteristics of local officials to test the hypothesis and will collect data on top political 
leaders in 333 prefecture municipalities in China between 1992 and 2008.39 A mayor or 
the party secretary is defined as connected if at least one of his past colleagues, 
classmates, or natives is the provincial party secretary or governor.  
In order to test the hypothesis, three dependent variables are identified: capital 
construction and collective-owned investment in fixed assets, the annual GDP growth 
rate, and private investment in fixed assets in 333 municipal-level cities in China from 
1992 to 2008. The annual GDP growth rate is to measure the overall economic 
performance; the construction and collective-owned investment in fixed assets measure 
                                                          
39 I start from 1992 because this is the division year of private enterprise as the introduction of the Company law paved 
the way to the rapid private investment. More importantly, this is the year to which the detailed biographical data of 
political leaders and private investment in fixed assets can be traced back.  
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the allocation of government support; and the private investment in fixed assets is an 
indicator to measure the development of private economy. A host of control variables, 
mainly including initial economic conditions and geographical variables, are also 
involved in my model. I expect the empirical test will support my hypotheses.  
This project is built upon unresolved performance versus connections debates in 
the literature on the political economy of development and sheds light on this issue by 
examining the interplay of promotion incentives and political connections on economic 
development in China. Also, this research is one of the first attempts to address the 
politics of investment-driven growth in the context of huge regional disparities in 
economic development. Finally, in discussing the role of local officials on economic 
growth, scholars often focus on provincial leaders, county and township level officials; 
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APPENDIX A – ABOUT THE SURVEY DATA 
The Survey on Privately Owned Enterprises in China used in this study was jointly 
conducted in 2012 by the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC), the 
State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC), the United Front Work 
Department (UFWD), and the Institute of Chinese Private Economy at the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). It is the most recent survey among a series of 
similar ones conducted by the same team every two years since the 1990s. We obtained 
the survey data from the University Services Center at the Chinese University of Hong 
Kong. A detailed description of the survey is available on the center’s website 
(wwwusc.cuhk.edu.hk/DCS31-16.aspx). According to the description, the survey pooled 
across two samples, one sample (653 firms) obtained from the fixed observation points of 
the ACFIC and the other (4,094 firms) randomly selected from the population of all 
private firms as of 2011. For the random sample, a proportionate stratified sampling 
method was employed on the strata of the thirty-one provincial units in China. In total, 
the survey collected data on 4,747 firms.  
I admit the weaknesses of the survey. First, it is not a purely representative sample 
because a portion of it comes from the ACFIC’s fixed observation points. But the good 
this is that the proportion of the fixed observations dropped significantly in the 2012
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survey from almost 40% to 13.76%. Second, because the ACFIC was a major organizer, 
the sampling seems skewed toward ACFIC members. Finally, the survey included a 
nontrivial portion of missing values in most financial indicators, decreasing the sample 
size available for empirical analysis. Despite these weaknesses, the survey has been 







APPENDIX B – ABOUT THE MDEIA REPORTS OF GOVERNMENT-RELATED 
PROPERTY RIGHTS EXPROPRIATION CASES 
I acknowledge the limitations of our cases. First, the media exposure cases are not 
exhaustive since we are unable to include all property rights expropriation cases. It is 
likely that most of the government appropriation cases may not be made public. On the 
one hand, the private owners may, for instance, have a chance to negotiate with local 
governments regarding their property, so they will not expose their story in order to save 
the local officials’ face. On the other hand, large firms or those owners who have good 
connections with the media may have better chances to reveal their experiences. In 
addition, all the 279 cases we documented are related to direct expropriation. In practice, 
the indirect expropriation cases are perhaps far more common than the ones shown here 
(Nee and Opper 2012). 
Second, sometimes, it is difficult to distinguish between entrepreneurial crimes and 
government-related property rights appropriation involving private entrepreneurs because 
criminal charges are a common tool local governments use to prey on private firms. The 
number of criminal cases filed against private entrepreneurs rose sharply against the 
backdrop of the steady improvement of the legal status of private businesses. According 
to the report published by the Chinese Entrepreneurial Crime Prevention Research Centre 
at Beijing Normal University, 483 out of 599 entrepreneurial crimes in 2013 were 
committed or allegedly committed by private entrepreneurs. This is a significant increase 
from 2009 when private entrepreneurs committed merely 49 out of 84 entrepreneurial 
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crimes (Ren 2014). The most common charges brought against private entrepreneurs 
were illegally absorbing public savings, fraudulent fundraising, misappropriation of 
funds, and tax evasions.  
In some cases, private entrepreneurs were sentenced to prison for entrepreneurial 
crimes while still retaining their control over the firms and properties as shown in the 
“Huang Guangyu case.” In other cases, local governments confiscated private firms and 
properties in the name of cracking down on organized crimes in which private 
entrepreneurs were allegedly doing business with crime syndicates as demonstrated in the 
so-called “Chongqing model.” For our study, we include only the cases in which firms or 
properties were confiscated by the government for whatever crimes they committed or 
allegedly committed.  
